Country intelligence • Senegal
Senegal: market-entry intelligence
Three decisions an EU company faces with Senegal. Senegal became an oil and gas producer in 2024 (Sangomar field, Woodside Energy; GTA LNG with BP), transforming its economic profile. The West Africa interim EPA and EBA provide duty-free EU access. The CFA franc's EUR peg (655.957 XOF/EUR) eliminates exchange-rate risk. Senegal elected a young reformist president (Bassirou Diomaye Faye, March 2024) whose policy direction is still forming. The binding constraints are oil revenue management risk, infrastructure outside Dakar, and the CFA franc sovereignty debate.
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
1. Trade with Senegal
EU-Senegal FTA
In provisional application (West Africa interim EPA) + EBA[2]
● measured Senegal benefits from both the West Africa interim EPA and the EBA scheme (as an LDC), providing duty-free, quota-free EU market access. The CFA franc's peg to the euro at 655.957 XOF/EUR eliminates currency risk for EU companies, making Senegal one of the most straightforward West African markets for euro-denominated trade. The OHADA legal framework provides additional commercial law harmonisation.[2,3,7]
EU exports to Senegal by sector
| SITC section | Latest month (EUR) |
|---|---|
| 3. Mineral fuels and lubricants | EUR 132M |
| 0. Food and live animals | EUR 68M |
| 7. Machinery and transport equipment | EUR 53M |
| 5. Chemicals | EUR 32M |
| 6. Manufactured goods (by material) | EUR 26M |
| 8. Miscellaneous manufactured articles | EUR 11M |
| 2. Crude materials (excl. fuels) | EUR 7M |
| 1. Beverages and tobacco | EUR 4M |
| 9. Not classified elsewhere | 756,725 |
| 4. Animal and vegetable oils/fats | 61,283 |
Source: Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331). [4]
The Nordic lens: Finland's position
Finland's largest export sections: Crude materials (excl. fuels) (91,040), Manufactured goods (by material) (51,232), Machinery and transport equipment (24,245). Same COMEXT series, Finland as reporter.
Certification gate
● measured ASN (Association Senegalaise de Normalisation) sets national standards. WAEMU regional standards apply. Food safety regulated by Ministry of Commerce and SMEs. Pharmaceutical regulation by Ministry of Health (Direction de la Pharmacie et du Medicament). ECOWAS trade liberalisation scheme (ETLS) for intra-regional trade.[5]
- ASN mandatory standards for electrical products, construction materials, food products
- WAEMU harmonised standards for pharmaceuticals, food safety, and consumer protection
- Destination inspection: pre-shipment verification of conformity (COTECNA or similar contracted by government)
- EU phytosanitary requirements for horticulture exports (green beans, mangoes) are the binding constraint for agri-exports
◐ inferred For EU-bound horticulture exports, meeting EU phytosanitary standards (maximum residue levels, traceability) is the key certification challenge. For imports into Senegal, pre-shipment inspection adds cost and time. The OHADA framework and WAEMU harmonisation reduce legal complexity relative to non-OHADA countries.
Free Trade Agreement
● measured Senegal has ratified the West Africa interim EPA with the EU. Provides duty-free, quota-free EU market access for Senegalese goods. As an LDC, Senegal also benefits from the EU's EBA (Everything But Arms) scheme, which provides the same duty-free, quota-free access regardless of the EPA. The full ECOWAS-wide EPA remains stalled (Nigeria has not signed). WAEMU/ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) applies to non-preferential imports: 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 35% bands.[2] Ratification status: Senegal ratified; provisional application. Full regional EPA depends on ECOWAS-wide consensus.
2. Establish in Senegal
Entity forms
| Type | What it can do | Route / approval | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| S.A.R.L. (Societe a Responsabilite Limitee) | Most common structure for FDI in Senegal. 100% foreign ownership permitted in most sectors. Minimum 1 shareholder, 1 manager. Minimum capital: XOF 100,000 (~EUR 152). OHADA Uniform Act governs formation. Registration through APIX one-stop-shop (Centre de Facilitation des Procedures Administratives). Company formation takes 2-5 days through APIX. | APIX: 2-5 business days for standard S.A.R.L. | 1-2 weeks total (including bank account) |
| S.A. (Societe Anonyme) | Used for larger enterprises and those seeking to issue securities. Minimum 1 shareholder (can be single-member S.A. under OHADA reform). Board of directors (3-12 members) or sole administrator. Minimum capital: XOF 10,000,000 (~EUR 15,245). OHADA Uniform Act governs. More complex governance requirements than S.A.R.L. | APIX: 1-2 weeks for S.A. | 2-4 weeks total |
| Branch (Succursale) | Registration of foreign company to operate in Senegal. Not a separate legal entity. Parent has unlimited liability. Must register with OHADA commercial register (RCCM) and APIX. Must appoint a local representative. Suitable for project-based operations (oil/gas, construction, consulting). | APIX: 1-2 weeks | 2-4 weeks |
FDI sectors: automatic vs government route
| Sector | FDI cap | Route | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oil and gas | State participation varies (Petrosen holds carried interest) | Conditional (Ministry of Petroleum + Petrosen) | Senegal became an oil producer in June 2024 (Sangomar field, Woodside Energy operator, ~100,000 bbl/d plateau). GTA LNG (BP/Kosmos, cross-border with Mauritania) targeting first gas 2024-2025. Petrosen (national oil company) holds 10-20% carried interest. Petroleum Code (2019) governs upstream. CIT 30% + additional upstream-specific terms. |
| Fishing and seafood | Restricted (licensing regime for foreign vessels) | Conditional (Ministry of Fisheries licensing) | Fishing is Senegal's #1 historical export sector. Artisanal fishing employs ~600,000 people. Foreign fishing vessels require licences. EU-Senegal Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) renewed 2024. Overfishing and IUU (illegal, unreported, unregulated) fishing are concerns. Processing and export of fish products is open to FDI. |
| Phosphates and mining | 100% (state may take minority stake) | Conditional (Mining Code licensing) | ICS (Industries Chimiques du Senegal) is the major phosphate producer. Mining Code (2016) governs. State may hold up to 10% free-carry in mining operations. Gold mining in eastern Senegal (Kedougou region). Zircon/titanium sands (Grande Cote, Eramet/Tronox). |
| Agriculture (groundnuts, horticulture) | 100% | Automatic (APIX registration) | Groundnuts (peanuts) are a traditional export crop. Horticulture exports (green beans, mangoes, cherry tomatoes) to EU growing. Senegal River valley irrigation for rice, sugar. OHADA land law applies; customary land tenure complicates large-scale agriculture. |
| Tourism | 100% | Automatic (APIX registration) | Dakar, Saint-Louis (UNESCO), Casamance beaches. Tourism contributes ~5% of GDP. Hotel and resort development open to FDI. Air Senegal (national carrier) re-established 2018. New Blaise Diagne International Airport (AIBD, opened 2017) improved connectivity. |
| BPO / IT services | 100% | Automatic (APIX registration) | Dakar is a francophone BPO hub (French-language call centres, data processing). Emerging tech/startup ecosystem (Dakar, Diamniadio). Free-zone incentives available. French language gives Senegal a niche in serving francophone markets. |
| Telecommunications | 100% | Conditional (ARTP licensing) | ARTP (Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications et des Postes) regulates. Sonatel (Orange subsidiary, ~55% mobile market share), Free (Tigo acquisition), Expresso. Mobile penetration >100%. Mobile money growing rapidly (Orange Money, Wave). |
Corporate tax rates
| Scenario | Basic rate | Effective rate | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard | 30% | 30% | Applies to most sectors. Senegal taxes worldwide income of resident companies. |
| SME simplified regime | Variable | Lower | Small and medium enterprises with turnover below thresholds qualify for a simplified tax regime (impot synthetique): flat-rate tax based on turnover, replacing CIT, VAT, and business licence tax. |
| Free zone enterprises | Various | Reduced | Special Economic Zones (Diamniadio, others) offer CIT reductions, customs duty exemptions, and VAT exemptions for qualifying activities. Terms vary by zone and activity. |
MAT: Minimum tax: 0.5% of turnover (minimum XOF 500,000).. Foreign company PE rate: 30% on Senegal-source income..[1]
Value-added tax (VAT)
18%[1]
VAT at 18% standard rate. Reduced rate: 10% (tourism, certain services). Exempt: basic foodstuffs, agricultural inputs, educational and medical supplies. VAT registration threshold applies. WAEMU harmonised VAT framework.
Withholding tax / TDS (key rates for EU parent)
| Type | Rate | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Dividends to non-resident | 10% | 10% final withholding tax. Reduced under DTAs. Senegal has 20+ DTAs (including France, Belgium, Canada, Morocco, Tunisia). |
| Interest to non-resident | 16% | 16% on interest payments to non-residents. Reducible under DTAs. |
| Royalties to non-resident | 20% | 20% on royalties paid to non-residents. Reducible under DTAs. |
| Service fees to non-resident | 20% | 20% on management and technical service fees paid to non-residents. |
Payment and currency
● measured CFA franc (XOF) pegged to the euro at 655.957 XOF/EUR. The peg is guaranteed by the French Treasury under the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) monetary cooperation agreement. Inflation is structurally low (2-4% typically). No exchange-rate risk for euro-denominated transactions. The CFA franc zone covers 8 WAEMU countries. Capital account convertibility is guaranteed within the zone. Operations account held at the French Treasury.[5] Profit repatriation permitted. The CFA franc is freely convertible to euros through the BCEAO mechanism. Transfers within the franc zone are unrestricted. Transfers outside the zone require BCEAO authorisation but are routinely approved for legitimate business purposes. No foreign exchange shortage risk (the peg is guaranteed by the French Treasury).
◐ inferred Payment terms in Senegalese B2B trade are typically 30-90 days (francophone Africa tends toward longer terms than anglophone). EUR invoicing is natural given the CFA peg. Mobile money growing rapidly (Orange Money, Wave). Banking sector is concentrated (SGBS/Societe Generale, CBAO/Attijariwafa, Ecobank). OHADA Uniform Act on commercial transactions governs payment obligations and enforcement.[5]
Production-Linked Incentives
● measured Senegal uses APIX investment incentives, free zones (Diamniadio, Dakar), and sector-specific regimes. The Investment Code (2004, reformed 2012) provides customs and tax incentives for qualifying investments. The oil/gas sector is governed by the Petroleum Code (2019). Senegal's Plan Senegal Emergent (PSE) identified priority sectors for investment.[5,6,8,9]
| Sector | Status |
|---|---|
| Oil and gas (Sangomar, GTA LNG) | Senegal's first oil (Sangomar, June 2024, Woodside Energy, ~100,000 bbl/d). GTA LNG (BP/Kosmos, cross-border Mauritania, ~2.5 Mtpa phase 1). Petrosen holds government interest. New producer: revenue management and local content are key policy issues. CIT 30% + sector-specific fiscal terms. |
| Fishing and seafood | #1 historical export sector. EU-Senegal Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA). Processing and value-addition open to FDI. Overfishing risk requires sustainable sourcing. EU food safety standards must be met for exports. |
| Phosphates and mining | ICS (Industries Chimiques du Senegal) major producer. Gold mining in Kedougou region (Sabodala, Endeavour Mining). Zircon/titanium sands (Grande Cote, Eramet). Mining Code (2016) governs. |
| Agriculture (groundnuts, horticulture) | Groundnut processing and export. Growing horticulture exports to EU (green beans, mangoes, cherry tomatoes). Senegal River valley irrigation. Land tenure complexity is a constraint for large-scale agriculture. |
| Tourism | Dakar, Saint-Louis (UNESCO), Casamance. ~5% of GDP. AIBD airport (2017) improved connectivity. Hotel and resort investment open. |
| BPO and IT services | Francophone BPO hub. Dakar tech ecosystem emerging. Diamniadio industrial and tech park. French language niche. |
Senegal's transition to oil/gas producer creates both opportunity and governance risk. The new administration (President Faye, elected March 2024) has signalled resource nationalism and contract renegotiation. Revenue management and local content requirements are evolving. The CFA franc peg provides stability but limits monetary policy flexibility.
Labour framework
● measured Senegal's Labour Code (Code du Travail, 1997) governs employment. National minimum wage: XOF 302.89/hour (~EUR 0.46/hour) for non-agricultural workers. Employer social contributions: ~20% of gross salary (CSS: family allowances, work accidents, retirement via IPRES). Standard working week: 40 hours. Overtime: 1.15x-1.60x. Annual leave: 24 working days. OHADA Uniform Act on labour law supplements the national code. Labour law is national. Labour inspectorate handles disputes. Labour courts for unresolved matters. The formal sector is a minority of the workforce (~10%); the informal sector dominates. Dakar concentrates formal employment. Youth unemployment is a major social and political issue (~30% for 15-24 age group).[5]
- Minimum wage XOF 302.89/hour (non-agricultural); last adjusted 2018; among the lowest in West Africa
- Employer contributions: ~20% of gross salary (CSS family allowances 7%, work accidents 1-5%, IPRES retirement 8.4%)
- Severance: calculated based on years of service; Labour Code specifies entitlements
- Work permits for foreigners: Ministry of Labour authorisation required; local hiring preferences apply
- Large informal sector (~90% of workforce): labour regulation primarily affects formal sector, mostly in Dakar
The opportunity
Senegal's opportunity for EU companies rests on four pillars: new oil and gas production (Sangomar field with Woodside, GTA LNG with BP), the CFA franc's EUR peg eliminating FX risk, EPA duty-free access, and fishing as the #1 traditional export sector.
New oil/gas producer (Sangomar/GTA)
● measured Senegal became an oil and gas producer in 2024 with the Sangomar field (Woodside Energy) and GTA LNG (BP). This transforms the economic profile from a net energy importer to a producer, creating opportunities in oilfield services, infrastructure, and downstream processing.[5]
CFA EUR peg: zero FX risk
● measured The CFA franc is pegged to the euro at 655.957 XOF/EUR with guaranteed convertibility through the French Treasury. This eliminates exchange-rate risk for EU companies, a unique advantage in West Africa.[1]
EPA duty-free
● measured The West Africa interim EPA and EBA provide duty-free, quota-free access for Senegalese goods entering the EU. Fish products, groundnuts, and phosphates are the main beneficiary exports.[5]
Fishing: #1 export sector
● measured Fishing is Senegal's largest traditional export sector. The EU is a major destination for Senegalese fish products. EU companies participate through fishing agreements, processing, and cold-chain logistics.[5]
3. Dangers register
5 entries across 5 categories. Each states the mechanism (how it bites an EU company), the evidence (sourced), the mitigation, and what evidence would change the assessment.
Oil and gas revenue management risk (new producer)
Senegal became an oil producer in June 2024 (Sangomar field, Woodside Energy) and expects LNG revenues from GTA (BP/Kosmos, cross-border with Mauritania). The country has no track record of managing hydrocarbon revenues. The resource curse pattern (Dutch disease, rent-seeking, institutional erosion) is a documented risk for new producers. Senegal has established a sovereign wealth fund framework and is an EITI member, but institutional capacity is untested at scale.
● measured Sangomar: first oil June 2024, ~100,000 bbl/d plateau. GTA LNG: ~2.5 Mtpa phase 1. Senegal's 2019 Petroleum Code establishes revenue-sharing framework. ITIE (EITI) membership since 2013 provides some transparency baseline. Government budget has begun incorporating oil revenue projections. The new Faye administration has signalled desire to renegotiate some upstream contracts.[11]
Political transition and policy direction uncertainty
Bassirou Diomaye Faye was elected president in March 2024, ending the Macky Sall era. Faye (age 44, PASTEF party) and PM Ousmane Sonko represent a generational and ideological shift. Their platform includes resource nationalism, pan-Africanism, review of foreign contracts, and CFA franc reform. The policy direction is still forming. Pre-election rhetoric may or may not translate into action. Senegal has a strong democratic tradition (never had a coup) but the new government's economic policy is still uncertain.
● measured Faye won March 2024 presidential election with ~54% in the first round. PASTEF won legislative supermajority in Nov 2024 snap elections. Sonko appointed PM. Government has announced reviews of mining and oil contracts. Some foreign companies have reported increased scrutiny. Macroeconomic policy has remained broadly orthodox so far.[12]
Oil and gas revenue management risk (new producer)
Mechanism: Senegal became an oil producer in June 2024 (Sangomar field, Woodside Energy) and expects LNG revenues from GTA (BP/Kosmos, cross-border with Mauritania). The country has no track record of managing hydrocarbon revenues. The resource curse pattern (Dutch disease, rent-seeking, institutional erosion) is a documented risk for new producers. Senegal has established a sovereign wealth fund framework and is an EITI member, but institutional capacity is untested at scale.
Evidence: Sangomar: first oil June 2024, ~100,000 bbl/d plateau. GTA LNG: ~2.5 Mtpa phase 1. Senegal's 2019 Petroleum Code establishes revenue-sharing framework. ITIE (EITI) membership since 2013 provides some transparency baseline. Government budget has begun incorporating oil revenue projections. The new Faye administration has signalled desire to renegotiate some upstream contracts.[11]
Current status: Active. Revenue flows are beginning (2024-2025). The critical period is the first 3-5 years of revenue management. Contract renegotiation rhetoric from the Faye government adds uncertainty for existing operators.
Mitigation: Monitor government fiscal reporting on hydrocarbon revenues. Track EITI reports for transparency. Structure investments to avoid dependence on government co-investment from oil revenues. For upstream operators: engage proactively with the new administration on local content and fiscal terms.
What would change the assessment: Transparent, rules-based revenue management over the first 3-5 years. Successful fiscal stabilisation fund operation. No renegotiation of signed contracts beyond legitimate fiscal adjustments. Diversified growth alongside oil revenues.
Political transition and policy direction uncertainty
Mechanism: Bassirou Diomaye Faye was elected president in March 2024, ending the Macky Sall era. Faye (age 44, PASTEF party) and PM Ousmane Sonko represent a generational and ideological shift. Their platform includes resource nationalism, pan-Africanism, review of foreign contracts, and CFA franc reform. The policy direction is still forming. Pre-election rhetoric may or may not translate into action. Senegal has a strong democratic tradition (never had a coup) but the new government's economic policy is still uncertain.
Evidence: Faye won March 2024 presidential election with ~54% in the first round. PASTEF won legislative supermajority in Nov 2024 snap elections. Sonko appointed PM. Government has announced reviews of mining and oil contracts. Some foreign companies have reported increased scrutiny. Macroeconomic policy has remained broadly orthodox so far.[12]
Current status: Active. The Faye-Sonko government is in its first two years. Contract review processes are underway but no major expropriations or renegotiations have been completed. The democratic institutions (judiciary, press, civil society) remain functional. The binding question is whether reform rhetoric translates into investor-hostile action or into improved governance.
Mitigation: Engage with APIX and relevant ministries early. Ensure contracts are structured under OHADA framework (provides supranational legal protections). Monitor legislative developments, particularly in extractive sectors. Senegal's democratic institutions provide recourse mechanisms that many West African peers lack.
What would change the assessment: Clear, predictable economic policy framework from the Faye government. Completion of contract reviews without retroactive changes. Continued respect for OHADA legal framework and international arbitration commitments.
CFA franc regime change risk
Mechanism: The CFA franc (XOF) is pegged to the euro at 655.957 XOF/EUR, guaranteed by the French Treasury. This peg provides zero exchange-rate risk for EU companies and low inflation for Senegal. However, the CFA franc is politically contested: the Faye-Sonko government and broader pan-African movements view it as a colonial relic. The ECOWAS ECO currency (proposed single currency) has been repeatedly delayed. Any change to the peg mechanism, whether devaluation, float, or transition to a new currency, would fundamentally alter the risk profile.
Evidence: The CFA franc has been pegged since 1945 (revalued once in 1994, devaluation from 50:1 to 100:1 against the French franc). 2019 reform renamed the West African CFA franc and ended the requirement to hold 50% of reserves at the French Treasury, but the peg and French guarantee remain. Faye and Sonko have publicly criticised the CFA system. No concrete steps toward exit have been taken as of mid-2026. The ECOWAS ECO currency has missed multiple launch dates.[13]
Current status: Latent but politically salient. The CFA peg remains in place and the French guarantee holds. Rhetoric about CFA reform is louder under the Faye government but no exit timeline or mechanism has been proposed. The 1994 devaluation precedent shows that changes can be sudden when they come. BCEAO policy independence from individual member states limits unilateral action by Senegal.
Mitigation: The CFA peg is currently the single most EU-investor-friendly feature of the Senegalese market. Monitor BCEAO communiques and WAEMU heads-of-state summits for any signals. Structure long-duration investments to account for the tail risk of devaluation. Note that Senegal cannot unilaterally exit the CFA zone (requires WAEMU/BCEAO process).
What would change the assessment: WAEMU-wide decision to abandon the peg. French Treasury withdrawing the guarantee. Successful launch of ECOWAS ECO currency. Coordinated exit by multiple WAEMU member states.
Infrastructure gap outside Dakar corridor
Mechanism: Senegal's infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, internet) is concentrated in the Dakar-Thies-Diamniadio corridor. Outside this zone, infrastructure quality drops sharply. Casamance (southern Senegal) is physically separated from the rest of the country by The Gambia, requiring transit through a foreign country or a long detour. The Senegal River valley (north) and eastern regions (Kedougou, Tambacounda) have limited road networks and unreliable power. Logistics costs for interior locations are significantly higher than Dakar.
Evidence: Dakar concentrates ~25% of Senegal's population and the vast majority of formal economic activity. Diamniadio (new administrative city, ~30 km from Dakar) is the government's infrastructure bet. Trans-Gambia bridge (opened 2019) improved Casamance connectivity but did not eliminate the foreign-transit issue. Electricity access: ~70% nationally (2024), significantly lower in rural areas. Road network: ~16,000 km, of which ~5,000 km paved.[14]
Current status: Structural. Infrastructure investment is ongoing (Diamniadio, TER commuter rail, road programmes) but the gap between Dakar and the interior will persist for years. For investments outside Dakar, infrastructure assessment is essential.
Mitigation: Focus initial market entry on Dakar and the Dakar-Thies-Diamniadio corridor. For interior operations (mining in Kedougou, agriculture in the Senegal River valley), budget for captive power, logistics premiums, and connectivity solutions. Assess Casamance accessibility via the Trans-Gambia bridge versus the Ziguinchor-Dakar ferry.
What would change the assessment: Completion of the Dakar-Tambacounda highway upgrade. Extension of reliable power grid beyond the Dakar region. Sustained investment in rural electrification and digital infrastructure.
Casamance separatism (MFDC, low-intensity)
Mechanism: The Casamance conflict (MFDC, Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance) has been active since 1982, making it one of Africa's longest-running separatist movements. However, the conflict has been largely quiescent since the 2014 ceasefire. Peace negotiations have advanced under successive governments. The Faye government has signalled commitment to a final peace settlement. Residual risks include landmines in some areas and occasional low-level incidents.
Evidence: MFDC has splintered into multiple factions, most of which have laid down arms. The last significant violent incident was in 2018. Landmine contamination remains in parts of the Casamance forest zone. Tourism to Casamance has resumed at low levels. Ziguinchor (regional capital) is secure. The conflict has never spread beyond Casamance.[15]
Current status: Largely resolved. The Faye government (which draws political support from Casamance) has prioritised a final peace agreement. For investments in Casamance (agriculture, tourism, cashew processing), the residual risk is low but site-specific assessment is warranted.
Mitigation: For Casamance investments: conduct site-specific security assessment. Avoid landmine-risk areas (CNAMS, the national demining centre, provides maps). For investments outside Casamance: this risk is not material. The conflict has never affected Dakar or other regions.
What would change the assessment: Final peace agreement with remaining MFDC factions. Complete demining of affected areas. Sustained economic development in Casamance reducing grievances.
15 primary sources spanning EU/Senegalese government publications, WTO tariff data, Eurostat trade data, and specialist legal/tax summaries.
- [1] PwC / ICLG, Senegal Corporate Tax Laws (2026): 30% standard CIT, SME simplified regime, free zone incentives
- [2] West Africa interim EPA: Senegal ratified, in provisional application; duty-free, quota-free EU market access; Senegal also benefits from EBA (Everything But Arms) as LDC
- [3] WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2025: Senegal
- [4] Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331): EU27 and Finland trade with Senegal by SITC section, monthly
- [5] US Department of State / Chambers, 2025-2026 Investment Climate: Senegal
- [6] APIX (Agence nationale chargee de la Promotion de l'Investissement et des Grands Travaux): one-stop-shop for investment registration, business licensing, and incentives
- [7] OHADA (Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires): uniform commercial law framework covering 17 African states; governs company formation, commercial contracts, insolvency
- [8] Woodside Energy, Sangomar field: first oil June 2024, ~100,000 bbl/d plateau; Senegal's first deepwater oil production
- [9] Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) LNG: BP (operator) and Kosmos Energy; cross-border Senegal-Mauritania; first gas expected 2024-2025; FLNG (floating LNG) ~2.5 Mtpa phase 1
- [10] Transparency International, CPI 2025: Senegal score ~43/100, rank ~70/182 (relatively strong for West Africa, comparable to Ghana)
- [11] Resource curse risk: Senegal became an oil producer Jun 2024 (Sangomar); GTA LNG with BP expected 2024-2025; new revenue flows into an untested institutional framework; ITIE (EITI) member since 2013
- [12] Political transition: Bassirou Diomaye Faye elected Mar 2024 (youngest president in Senegalese history, age 44); Ousmane Sonko as PM; PASTEF party; reformist platform; resource nationalism signals; contract renegotiation rhetoric
- [13] CFA franc sovereignty debate: XOF pegged to EUR at 655.957; PASTEF/Faye-Sonko have criticised the CFA as a colonial relic; any change to the peg would fundamentally alter the risk profile for EU investors; ECO currency (ECOWAS single currency) repeatedly delayed
- [14] Infrastructure outside Dakar: road, power, water, and digital infrastructure degrade rapidly outside the Dakar-Thies-Diamniadio corridor; Casamance physically separated by The Gambia; logistics costs high for interior regions
- [15] Casamance separatism (MFDC): Africa's oldest active rebel movement (since 1982); largely quiescent since 2014 ceasefire; low-intensity; peace process advancing under successive governments; landmine legacy in some areas
As of August 2026. Statutory facts verified against primary sources; practice claims cite the basis.