Country intelligence • Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan: market-entry intelligence
Three decisions an EU company faces with Uzbekistan. Central Asia's fastest-reforming economy since 2017, with a 15% CIT rate (one of the lowest in the template), GSP+ duty-free EU access, and significant gold (#9 global), uranium (#5), and natural gas resources. The cotton sector has been reformed (ILO declared forced labour eradicated in 2022). GM Uzbekistan produces vehicles for regional export. The binding constraints are authoritarian governance, corruption (CPI ~26), SOE dominance (~55% of GDP), and water scarcity (Aral Sea crisis).
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
1. Trade with Uzbekistan
● measured The GSP+ arrangement gives Uzbekistan duty-free EU access on ~66% of tariff lines, a significant advantage for textiles and agricultural exports. The ongoing EPCA negotiations signal deepening EU-Uzbekistan economic ties, particularly in the context of the EU's Central Asia strategy and interest in diversifying supply chains away from China and Russia. Uzbekistan's WTO accession process adds momentum to trade liberalisation.[2,8,3]
EU exports to Uzbekistan by sector
| SITC section | Latest month (EUR) |
|---|---|
| 7. Machinery and transport equipment | EUR 122M |
| 5. Chemicals | EUR 112M |
| 0. Food and live animals | EUR 32M |
| 8. Miscellaneous manufactured articles | EUR 30M |
| 6. Manufactured goods (by material) | EUR 20M |
| 2. Crude materials (excl. fuels) | EUR 7M |
| 3. Mineral fuels and lubricants | EUR 5M |
| 1. Beverages and tobacco | EUR 3M |
| 4. Animal and vegetable oils/fats | 381,574 |
| 9. Not classified elsewhere | 43,610 |
Source: Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331). [4]
The Nordic lens: Finland's position
Finland's largest export sections: Manufactured goods (by material) (EUR 1M), Food and live animals (811,785), Machinery and transport equipment (359,560). Same COMEXT series, Finland as reporter.
Certification gate
● measured Uzbekstandard (national standards body) sets and enforces product standards. Mandatory certification for food products, construction materials, electrical equipment, and pharmaceuticals. Uzbekistan is transitioning from Soviet-era GOST standards to international standards (ISO, IEC). Halal certification relevant for food sector (predominantly Muslim population).[5]
- Mandatory conformity assessment for food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, electrical products
- Transition from GOST to international standards (ISO, IEC) is ongoing but incomplete
- Halal certification increasingly important for food exports (Uzstandard + private certification bodies)
- Phytosanitary certificates for agricultural exports (State Plant Quarantine Inspectorate)
- WTO accession process driving standards harmonisation and transparency
◐ inferred The transition from GOST to international standards creates opportunities for EU companies familiar with ISO/IEC frameworks. However, the dual standards regime (GOST and international) can create compliance complexity. Halal certification is a growing requirement.
Free Trade Agreement
● measured Uzbekistan has been an EU GSP+ beneficiary since April 2021, providing duty-free access on approximately 66% of EU tariff lines. GSP+ is conditional on ratification and effective implementation of 27 international conventions (human rights, labour, environment, governance). An Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) is under negotiation, which would replace the 1999 PCA and provide a more comprehensive trade and investment framework.[2,8] Ratification status: GSP+ in force since Apr 2021. EPCA negotiations ongoing (launched 2018). WTO accession negotiations active (Uzbekistan is an observer).
2. Establish in Uzbekistan
Entity forms
| Type | What it can do | Route / approval | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Limited Liability Company (LLC / OOK) | Most common structure for FDI. 100% foreign ownership permitted in most sectors. Minimum 1 founder. No minimum charter capital for most activities (sector-specific minimums apply for banking, insurance). State Investment Committee provides one-stop-shop registration. Registration with the Single State Register of Legal Entities. | Registration: 1-3 business days (simplified since 2017 reforms); total with bank account and tax registration: 2-4 weeks | 2-4 weeks total |
| Joint-Stock Company (JSC / AJ) | Used for larger enterprises and those seeking to raise capital. Open JSC (public) or closed JSC (private). Minimum charter capital: 400M UZS for open JSC, 40M UZS for closed JSC. Board of supervisors required. Less common for FDI than LLC. | Registration: 3-5 business days; total: 4-8 weeks | 4-8 weeks |
| Branch / Representative Office | Branch: can conduct commercial activity, taxed on Uzbek-source income. Representative office: liaison activities only (market research, promotion), no commercial activity. Both require accreditation with the Ministry of Justice. Parent has unlimited liability. | Accreditation: 2-4 weeks; total with permits: 4-8 weeks | 4-8 weeks |
FDI sectors: automatic vs government route
| Sector | FDI cap | Route | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mining (gold, uranium) | 100% (state retains strategic interests) | Conditional (State Committee for Geology licensing) | Uzbekistan is the world's #9 gold producer and #5 uranium producer. Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combinat (NMMC) is the dominant state-owned operator. Foreign participation typically through joint ventures with NMMC or production-sharing agreements. Uranium sector historically closed but opening selectively (Orano, Rosatom partnerships). |
| Natural gas and energy | 100% (strategic sectors: state involvement typical) | Conditional (Ministry of Energy licensing) | Uzbekistan is Central Asia's largest natural gas producer. Uzbekneftegaz is the state operator. Foreign companies (Lukoil, CNPC, KOGAS) operate under production-sharing agreements. Government prioritising gas-to-chemicals over raw exports. Domestic gas prices below market (implicit subsidy). |
| Textiles and cotton processing | 100% | Automatic (SIC registration) | Uzbekistan was the world's #6 cotton producer. Government has shifted from raw cotton export to domestic textile processing (raw cotton export banned since 2020). ILO declared forced/child labour in cotton eradicated in 2022, but monitoring continues. Free economic zone incentives for textile clusters (Namangan, Fergana). |
| Automotive | 100% (GM Uzbekistan dominates) | Conditional (government partnership preferred) | GM Uzbekistan (formerly UzDaewoo) produces Chevrolet vehicles for domestic and regional markets. High import duties on foreign vehicles protect domestic production. Government seeking to diversify automotive supply chain and attract component manufacturers. |
| Agriculture (fruits, vegetables) | 100% | Automatic (SIC registration) | Major producer of stone fruits, grapes, melons, vegetables. Export potential to Russia, Kazakhstan, and increasingly EU (GSP+ advantage). Cold chain and processing infrastructure is the binding constraint. Government incentives for agro-processing in free economic zones. |
| IT and outsourcing | 100% | Automatic (IT Park registration for incentives) | IT Park Uzbekistan provides tax incentives: 0% CIT, 0% VAT, 0% social tax until 2028 for resident companies. Growing tech ecosystem in Tashkent. Young population (median age ~28). Russian-language IT outsourcing market. Government targets USD 5bn IT exports by 2030. |
| Financial services | 100% | Conditional (Central Bank of Uzbekistan licensing) | Banking sector dominated by state-owned banks (Uzpromstroybank, National Bank of Uzbekistan). Government privatising selected banks. Minimum capital requirements for foreign bank branches. Mobile payments and fintech growing rapidly (Payme, Click, Uzum). |
Corporate tax rates
| Scenario | Basic rate | Effective rate | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard | 15% | 15% | Reduced from 20% in January 2023. One of the lowest standard CIT rates in Central Asia. Uzbekistan taxes worldwide income of resident companies. |
| SME (turnover tax) | 4% | 4% | Small enterprises with annual revenue below threshold pay 4% turnover tax in lieu of CIT. Simplified regime. |
| Free economic zone (3-10 years) | 0% | 0% | Over 20 free economic zones offer CIT exemption for 3-10 years depending on investment size. Also customs duty exemptions on imported equipment and materials. |
| IT Park residents (until 2028) | 0% | 0% | IT Park residents: 0% CIT, 0% VAT, 0% social contributions tax until 2028. |
MAT: No minimum alternative tax.. Foreign company PE rate: 15% on Uzbek-source income for branches. Permanent establishment rules apply..[1]
Value-added tax (VAT)
12%[1]
VAT at 12% standard rate (reduced from 15% in 2023). Exempt: financial services, insurance, medical services, educational services. Zero-rated: exports. Registration threshold: annual turnover exceeding 1bn UZS.
Withholding tax / TDS (key rates for EU parent)
| Type | Rate | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Dividends to non-resident | 10% | 10% final withholding tax. Reduced under DTAs. Uzbekistan has 50+ DTAs (including UK, Germany, South Korea, China, Turkey). |
| Interest to non-resident | 10% | 10% on interest payments to non-residents. |
| Royalties to non-resident | 20% | 20% on royalties paid to non-residents. Reducible under DTAs. |
| Service fees to non-resident | 20% | Management and technical service fees: 20%. Reducible under DTAs. |
Payment and currency
● measured Managed float. The Uzbek som (UZS) was liberalised in September 2017 (currency reform unified the official and black-market rates, devaluing by ~50%). Since then: ~10,500/USD (2021), ~11,200/USD (2022), ~12,300/USD (2024), ~12,900/USD (2026). Gradual depreciation but no crisis episodes. Convertible for current account transactions since 2017 reform. Capital account: some restrictions remain (prior Central Bank approval for certain capital transfers).[5,6] Profit repatriation permitted since 2017 currency reform. Foreign investors can freely repatriate profits, dividends, and capital gains in foreign currency after tax obligations are met. The 2017 reform ended the dual exchange rate and made foreign exchange available through commercial banks at market rates.
◐ inferred Payment terms in Uzbek B2B trade are typically 30-60 days. USD invoicing is common in international trade. Banking system is dominated by state-owned banks but undergoing privatisation. Card payments growing rapidly (Humo, UzCard domestic networks). Mobile payments (Payme, Click) widespread for retail. Correspondent banking relationships with international banks are adequate but not deep.[5]
Production-Linked Incentives
● measured Uzbekistan offers free economic zones (20+ zones with CIT exemption 3-10 years), IT Park incentives (0% CIT/VAT/social tax until 2028), and sector-specific regimes. The State Investment Committee provides a one-stop-shop for FDI. The 2017-2023 reform programme under President Mirziyoyev has significantly liberalised the economy, but SOE dominance and regulatory unpredictability remain constraints.[6,7,2,5]
| Sector | Status |
|---|---|
| Gold and uranium mining | World's #9 gold producer, #5 uranium producer. Navoi Mining (NMMC) is the dominant state operator. Foreign participation through JVs and production-sharing agreements. Gold refinery capacity. Strategic minerals: tungsten, copper, molybdenum. |
| Textiles and cotton processing | Government banned raw cotton export (2020) to promote domestic processing. Textile clusters in Fergana Valley. Free economic zone incentives. ILO declared forced/child labour eradicated (2022). GSP+ access to EU supports garment exports. |
| Natural gas and petrochemicals | Central Asia's largest gas producer. Uzbekneftegaz state operator. Government prioritising gas-to-chemicals (Bukhara, Shurtan gas chemical complexes). Lukoil, CNPC, KOGAS active through PSAs. |
| Automotive and manufacturing | GM Uzbekistan produces Chevrolet vehicles. Government seeking component-supplier diversification. High import duties protect domestic production. Industrial zones offer incentives for manufacturing FDI. |
| IT and outsourcing | IT Park: 0% CIT/VAT/social tax until 2028. Young population (median age ~28). Russian and increasingly English language capabilities. Government targets USD 5bn IT exports by 2030. Growing freelance and outsourcing ecosystem. |
| Agriculture and agro-processing | Major producer of stone fruits, grapes, melons, vegetables. Export potential to Russia, EU (GSP+), and Middle East. Cold chain infrastructure is the binding constraint. Free economic zone incentives for agro-processing. |
SOE dominance in strategic sectors (mining, energy, banking, telecoms) means that foreign investors in these areas typically need to partner with or navigate around state entities. Regulatory unpredictability and informal administrative practices persist despite the reform programme. The reform momentum is real but dependent on continued presidential commitment.
Labour framework
● measured Uzbekistan's Labour Code (2023, new code replaced the 1995 code) governs employment. National minimum wage: ~920,000 UZS/month (~EUR 65/month). Employer social contributions: 12% of payroll (reduced from 25% in 2019 reforms). Standard working week: 40 hours. Overtime: 2x. Annual leave: 15 working days minimum (21 days for certain categories). Labour law is national (single code). Employment disputes handled by labour inspectorate and courts. The 2023 Labour Code modernised protections and aligned with ILO conventions. Forced labour in cotton was declared eradicated by ILO in 2022, though monitoring continues.[5,6]
- New Labour Code (2023): modernised employment protections, aligned with ILO standards
- Employer social contributions reduced from 25% to 12% (2019 reform) to formalise employment
- Minimum wage ~920,000 UZS/month (~EUR 65); adjusted periodically by presidential decree
- Work permits for foreigners: simplified since 2018; no quota system; permit issued within 5 business days for qualifying positions
- ILO declared forced/child labour in cotton harvest eradicated (2022); Third-Party Monitoring mechanism in place
The opportunity
Uzbekistan's opportunity for EU companies rests on four pillars: one of the lowest CIT rates in the template (15%), GSP+ duty-free access on ~66% of tariff lines, significant mineral wealth (gold #9 and uranium #5 globally), and an IT Park offering 0% tax until 2028.
CIT 15%: lowest in the template
● measured Uzbekistan's 15% corporate income tax rate is one of the lowest in this template. Combined with GSP+ duty-free access, the effective tax burden on EU-Uzbekistan trade is competitive.[1]
GSP+ duty-free access
● measured GSP+ provides duty-free EU access on approximately 66% of tariff lines. Uzbekistan's eligibility depends on continued compliance with 27 international conventions on human rights, labour, environment, and governance.[5]
Gold #9 / Uranium #5
● measured Significant mineral resources: gold (#9 globally), uranium (#5), and natural gas. These resources underpin both export revenue and the opportunity for EU sourcing partnerships in critical materials.[5]
IT Park: 0% until 2028
● measured The IT Park special regime offers 0% CIT, 0% social tax, and simplified visa procedures for IT companies until 2028. This has attracted regional IT outsourcing and software development operations.[5]
3. Dangers register
6 entries across 5 categories. Each states the mechanism (how it bites an EU company), the evidence (sourced), the mitigation, and what evidence would change the assessment.
Authoritarian governance and regulatory unpredictability
Uzbekistan is rated 'Not Free' by Freedom House (11/100). President Mirziyoyev, who took power after Karimov's death (2016), has implemented significant economic reforms but consolidated political control. The 2023 constitutional referendum extended presidential terms and reset the term clock. There is no genuine political opposition, free press, or independent judiciary. Regulatory decisions can be reversed by presidential decree. The reform programme is genuine but depends entirely on one person's political will.
● measured Freedom House 2025: 11/100. 2023 constitutional referendum: 90% approval (no real opposition permitted). Mirziyoyev has been president since 2016 and can now serve until 2037. Economic reforms (currency liberalisation, tax reduction, WTO accession process) are real but coexist with authoritarian political control. July 2022 Karakalpakstan protests were met with lethal force (21 killed).[12]
Corruption (CPI ~26/100)
Uzbekistan scores ~26/100 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (rank ~140/182). Despite Mirziyoyev's anti-corruption rhetoric and institutional reforms (Anti-Corruption Agency established 2020), corruption remains pervasive in government procurement, customs, tax administration, licensing, and the judiciary. SOE governance is opaque. Informal payments and facilitation fees are common in business-government interactions.
● measured TI CPI 2025: ~26/100, rank ~140/182. Improved from 17 in 2012 (under Karimov) but still among the most corrupt countries globally. The Anti-Corruption Agency has prosecuted some officials but is not independent of the presidency. Procurement transparency has improved (e-procurement system) but enforcement is uneven. The Karimov-era elite was replaced by Mirziyoyev-linked networks.[9]
Authoritarian governance and regulatory unpredictability
Mechanism: Uzbekistan is rated 'Not Free' by Freedom House (11/100). President Mirziyoyev, who took power after Karimov's death (2016), has implemented significant economic reforms but consolidated political control. The 2023 constitutional referendum extended presidential terms and reset the term clock. There is no genuine political opposition, free press, or independent judiciary. Regulatory decisions can be reversed by presidential decree. The reform programme is genuine but depends entirely on one person's political will.
Evidence: Freedom House 2025: 11/100. 2023 constitutional referendum: 90% approval (no real opposition permitted). Mirziyoyev has been president since 2016 and can now serve until 2037. Economic reforms (currency liberalisation, tax reduction, WTO accession process) are real but coexist with authoritarian political control. July 2022 Karakalpakstan protests were met with lethal force (21 killed).[12]
Current status: Structural. The reform programme continues and investor interest is high. But the political system lacks checks and balances, making regulatory predictability dependent on presidential preferences. Foreign investors in strategic sectors (mining, energy) are particularly exposed to discretionary government intervention.
Mitigation: Structure investments with political risk insurance (MIGA, OPIC). Use bilateral investment treaties (Uzbekistan has 50+ BITs). Maintain direct relationships with the State Investment Committee. Ensure compliance with all formal requirements to avoid discretionary enforcement.
What would change the assessment: Genuine political liberalisation (independent judiciary, free press, opposition parties). Constitutional constraints on executive power. Institutional reform that outlasts the current president.
Forced/child labour legacy in cotton (ILO declared eradicated 2022, monitoring continues)
Mechanism: Uzbekistan's cotton sector was historically built on state-organised forced labour, including child labour. Under international pressure, the government implemented reforms and the ILO's Third-Party Monitoring declared forced and child labour eradicated in 2022. The Cotton Campaign (a coalition of NGOs and brands) lifted its global boycott call in March 2022. However, the sector remains under scrutiny. Monitoring continues through independent observers. The legacy creates reputational risk for companies sourcing Uzbek cotton or textiles.
Evidence: ILO Third-Party Monitoring (2022): no systemic forced or child labour found. Cotton Campaign boycott lifted (Mar 2022). However: raw cotton export banned since 2020 (government shifted to domestic processing). The harvest is now mechanised or uses voluntary paid labour. Legacy reputational risk persists in some ESG screening frameworks.[10]
Current status: Largely resolved but under continued monitoring. The risk is primarily reputational rather than operational. EU EUDR does not directly apply to cotton, but EU due diligence frameworks (CSDDD) will require companies to assess forced-labour risk in supply chains. Uzbek textile exports to the EU benefit from GSP+ conditionality, which requires implementation of ILO conventions.
Mitigation: For textile/cotton investments: conduct supply chain due diligence documenting compliance with ILO standards. Reference ILO Third-Party Monitoring reports. Ensure labour practices exceed minimum standards. For non-cotton investments: the forced labour legacy is not directly relevant but inform ESG reporting.
What would change the assessment: Sustained ILO monitoring showing no regression. Full CSDDD compliance across Uzbek textile supply chains. Time (the forced labour system ended 2017-2021; reputational reset requires several more years of clean monitoring).
Corruption (CPI ~26/100)
Mechanism: Uzbekistan scores ~26/100 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (rank ~140/182). Despite Mirziyoyev's anti-corruption rhetoric and institutional reforms (Anti-Corruption Agency established 2020), corruption remains pervasive in government procurement, customs, tax administration, licensing, and the judiciary. SOE governance is opaque. Informal payments and facilitation fees are common in business-government interactions.
Evidence: TI CPI 2025: ~26/100, rank ~140/182. Improved from 17 in 2012 (under Karimov) but still among the most corrupt countries globally. The Anti-Corruption Agency has prosecuted some officials but is not independent of the presidency. Procurement transparency has improved (e-procurement system) but enforcement is uneven. The Karimov-era elite was replaced by Mirziyoyev-linked networks.[9]
Current status: Structural. Corruption is embedded in administrative processes. The reform trajectory is positive (CPI improved from 17 to 26 over a decade) but the absolute level remains very high. Foreign investors face corruption risk in licensing, customs, tax audits, and government contract execution.
Mitigation: Implement robust compliance programmes (FCPA, UK Bribery Act, EU anti-corruption frameworks). Use transparent procurement channels where available. Document all government interactions. Engage reputable local counsel. Political risk insurance.
What would change the assessment: Independent Anti-Corruption Agency with prosecution authority. Independent judiciary. CPI consistently above 35. Transparent SOE governance and privatisation.
SOE dominance in strategic sectors
Mechanism: State-owned enterprises dominate Uzbekistan's strategic sectors: mining (NMMC/Navoi Mining, Almalyk MMC), energy (Uzbekneftegaz, Uzbekenergo), banking (National Bank of Uzbekistan, Uzpromstroybank), telecoms (Uztelecom), and transport. SOEs enjoy preferential access to resources, financing, and contracts. The government has announced privatisation plans for selected banks, telecoms, and mining assets, but implementation has been slow and selective. Foreign investors in SOE-dominated sectors typically need to partner with or compete against entities that have structural advantages.
Evidence: EBRD transition report: SOEs account for ~55% of GDP. Privatisation of Ipoteka Bank and SQB announced but timelines extended. NMMC (gold mining) remains fully state-owned with no privatisation plans. Uzbekneftegaz restructuring ongoing. State procurement favours domestic SOEs.[14]
Current status: Structural. Privatisation momentum exists but is slow. The government views strategic sectors (gold, uranium, gas) as national assets. Foreign participation in these sectors is typically through JVs or production-sharing agreements rather than outright ownership. The banking sector is the most advanced in privatisation (IFC involvement).
Mitigation: For investments in SOE-dominated sectors: structure as JVs with state entities or pursue production-sharing agreements. Negotiate clear contractual terms with government guarantees. For sectors outside SOE dominance (IT, agriculture, textiles, manufacturing): full foreign ownership is practical.
What would change the assessment: Completion of announced bank privatisations. Mining sector opened to competitive licensing. Independent regulatory bodies separating state ownership from regulation. WTO accession locking in competitive-neutrality commitments.
Water scarcity and Aral Sea crisis
Mechanism: Uzbekistan is the most water-stressed country in Central Asia. Agriculture (primarily cotton and rice) consumes ~90% of water withdrawals. The Aral Sea has lost ~90% of its surface area since the 1960s due to irrigation diversion from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Water is shared with upstream neighbours (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan control headwaters), creating diplomatic tension. Climate change is reducing glacier melt (the long-term water source). Salinisation of agricultural land is advancing.
Evidence: World Bank: Central Asia water stress. Aral Sea surface area: ~67,000 km2 (1960) to ~8,000 km2 (2020). Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relations have improved under Mirziyoyev (including agreement on Rogun Dam), but water-sharing remains contested. Groundwater depletion in Fergana Valley. Salinisation affects ~50% of irrigated land in some provinces.[13]
Current status: Structural and worsening. Climate change reduces long-term water availability. Agricultural water use is inefficient (flood irrigation predominant). For non-agricultural investors, water scarcity affects industrial operations, urban water supply, and social stability in agricultural regions. Mining operations (gold, uranium) also require water.
Mitigation: For water-intensive operations: conduct water-availability assessments. Invest in water-efficient technology. For agricultural investments: drip irrigation and modern water management are essential. Monitor Uzbekistan-Tajikistan water-sharing agreements. Industrial operations in the Fergana Valley and Aral Sea region face the highest water stress.
What would change the assessment: Comprehensive water-sector reform (pricing, efficiency, allocation). Sustained Uzbekistan-Tajikistan cooperation on transboundary water. Drip irrigation adoption at scale. Climate adaptation investment.
UZS depreciation and capital account restrictions
Mechanism: The Uzbek som has depreciated gradually from ~10,500/USD (2021) to ~12,900/USD (2026), a ~23% depreciation over five years. The 2017 currency reform unified the official and black-market rates (devaluing by ~50%) and made the som convertible for current account transactions. However, capital account restrictions remain: prior Central Bank approval is required for certain capital transfers. The managed float has been stable (no crisis episodes) but steady depreciation erodes returns for foreign-currency investors.
Evidence: UZS/USD: ~10,500 (2021), ~11,200 (2022), ~12,300 (2024), ~12,900 (mid-2026). Inflation: ~10-12% (2025). Central Bank policy rate: ~14% (2025). The 2017 reform was the critical event; since then, depreciation has been gradual and predictable. Foreign exchange is available through commercial banks at market rates for current account transactions.[11]
Current status: Manageable. The depreciation is gradual and largely predictable (inflation differential with USD). The 2017 reform was a genuine liberalisation. The remaining capital account restrictions create some friction for large capital movements but have not caused repatriation problems in practice.
Mitigation: Denominate contracts in USD/EUR where possible. Structure investments to generate hard-currency revenue (exports). The gradual depreciation is predictable and can be factored into financial models. For large capital movements, engage with the Central Bank early.
What would change the assessment: Full capital account liberalisation. Inflation durably below 5%. WTO accession locking in monetary policy commitments. UZS stabilisation against a basket of currencies.
14 primary sources spanning EU/Uzbek government publications, WTO tariff data, Eurostat trade data, and specialist legal/tax summaries.
- [1] PwC / ICLG, Uzbekistan Corporate Tax Laws (2026): 15% standard CIT (reduced from 20% in 2023, one of the lowest in Central Asia), SME 4% turnover tax, VAT 12%
- [2] EU GSP+ beneficiary: Uzbekistan granted GSP+ in Apr 2021, providing duty-free access on ~66% of tariff lines; conditional on ratification and implementation of 27 international conventions
- [3] WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2025: Uzbekistan (WTO accession negotiations ongoing)
- [4] Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331): EU27 and Finland trade with Uzbekistan by SITC section, monthly
- [5] US Department of State / Chambers, 2025-2026 Investment Climate: Uzbekistan
- [6] State Investment Committee (SIC) of Uzbekistan: administers FDI promotion, free economic zones, and investment incentives
- [7] Uzbekistan Free Economic Zones: CIT exempt 3-10 years depending on zone and investment size; customs duty exemptions on imported equipment; over 20 free economic and special industrial zones
- [8] EU-Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA): negotiations launched 2018, ongoing; would replace 1999 PCA and deepen trade, investment, and regulatory cooperation
- [9] Transparency International, CPI 2025: Uzbekistan score ~26/100, rank ~140/182 (improved from 17 in 2012 but remains among the most corrupt countries globally)
- [10] ILO Third-Party Monitoring: declared forced and child labour in Uzbek cotton harvest eradicated (2022); monitoring continues through independent observers; Cotton Campaign lifted global boycott call (Mar 2022)
- [11] UZS/USD: ~10,500 (2021), ~11,200 (2022), ~12,300 (2024), ~12,900 (mid-2026); managed float since Sep 2017 currency reform; inflation ~10-12% (2025)
- [12] Freedom House 2025: Uzbekistan rated 'Not Free' (score 11/100); President Mirziyoyev consolidated power through 2023 constitutional referendum extending presidential terms; no genuine political opposition
- [13] Aral Sea crisis: Uzbekistan is the most water-stressed country in Central Asia; cotton and agriculture consume ~90% of water withdrawals; Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers shared with neighbours (water diplomacy with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan)
- [14] SOE sector: state-owned enterprises dominate mining (NMMC), energy (Uzbekneftegaz), banking (National Bank of Uzbekistan), telecoms (Uztelecom); privatisation programme announced but implementation slow; SOEs enjoy preferential treatment
As of August 2026. Statutory facts verified against primary sources; practice claims cite the basis.