Country intelligence • Mozambique
Mozambique: market-entry intelligence
Country profile · Critical materials · Energy · Graph
Three decisions an EU company faces with Mozambique. Mozambique holds world-class LNG reserves (TotalEnergies $20bn+ project, delayed by Cabo Delgado insurgency; Eni Coral South FLNG operational since 2022) and one of the world's largest graphite deposits (critical for EU battery anodes). The SADC EPA and EBA provide duty-free EU access. The binding constraints are the Cabo Delgado insurgency (ISIS-affiliated, disrupting LNG since 2017), corruption (CPI ~26), the hidden-debt scandal legacy, and near-absent infrastructure outside the Nacala corridor.
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
1. Trade with Mozambique
EU-Mozambique FTA
In force (SADC EPA + EBA)[2]
● measured Mozambique benefits from both the SADC EPA and EBA preferences, providing comprehensive duty-free, quota-free EU market access. This is particularly relevant for graphite (critical raw material for EU battery supply chain), aluminum, coal, cashew nuts, and future LNG exports. The dual preference regime gives Mozambique among the most favourable trade terms available to any African country for EU commerce.[2,3]
EU exports to Mozambique by sector
| SITC section | Latest month (EUR) |
|---|---|
| 5. Chemicals | EUR 29M |
| 7. Machinery and transport equipment | EUR 15M |
| 6. Manufactured goods (by material) | EUR 9M |
| 0. Food and live animals | EUR 8M |
| 8. Miscellaneous manufactured articles | EUR 6M |
| 2. Crude materials (excl. fuels) | EUR 1M |
| 1. Beverages and tobacco | EUR 1M |
| 3. Mineral fuels and lubricants | 436,235 |
| 4. Animal and vegetable oils/fats | 332,051 |
| 9. Not classified elsewhere | 95,266 |
Source: Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331). [4]
The Nordic lens: Finland's position
Finland's largest export sections: Not classified elsewhere (600,365), Mineral fuels and lubricants (90,095), Miscellaneous manufactured articles (66,746). Same COMEXT series, Finland as reporter.
Certification gate
● measured INNOQ (Instituto Nacional de Normalizacao e Qualidade) sets and enforces product standards. ADEM (Autoridade Reguladora de Energia) regulates energy sector. Food and pharmaceutical regulation through MISAU (Ministry of Health). Standards infrastructure is developing, with capacity concentrated in Maputo.[5]
- INNOQ mandatory standards for construction materials, electrical products, processed food
- Mining: environmental impact assessments required (MITADER / Ministry of Land and Environment)
- LNG: international standards (API, ISO) applied through concession contracts
- SADC harmonisation of standards underway but implementation uneven
◐ inferred Standards and certification infrastructure is less developed than in major African economies. For mining and LNG, international standards apply through concession agreements. For consumer goods, INNOQ certification is required but capacity is limited.
Free Trade Agreement
● measured Mozambique is a SADC EPA state. The EU-SADC EPA provides duty-free, quota-free EU market access. As an LDC, Mozambique also qualifies for EBA (Everything But Arms), providing additional preferential access. Mozambique is progressively liberalising its own tariffs on EU imports under the SADC EPA schedule.[2] Ratification status: SADC EPA provisionally applied since 2016. EBA: automatic eligibility as LDC.
2. Establish in Mozambique
Entity forms
| Type | What it can do | Route / approval | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sociedade por Quotas (Lda.) | LLC equivalent and the most common structure for FDI. 100% foreign ownership permitted in most sectors. Minimum 2 quota holders. No minimum capital requirement specified by law but APIEX registration may impose practical thresholds. Mining: government may acquire up to 5% free-carry interest. | Registry: 2-4 weeks; APIEX: 2-4 weeks; total with bank account: 4-8 weeks | 4-8 weeks total |
| Sociedade Anonima (S.A.) | Public limited company. Suitable for larger operations and capital-market access. Minimum 3 shareholders. Board of directors required. Used by major LNG and mining projects. | Registry: 3-6 weeks; APIEX: 2-4 weeks | 6-10 weeks |
| Branch Office | Registration of foreign company to operate in Mozambique. Not a separate legal entity. Parent has unlimited liability. Must register with Commercial Registry and APIEX. Common for oil/gas and construction project operations. | Registry: 3-6 weeks; APIEX: 2-4 weeks | 6-10 weeks |
FDI sectors: automatic vs government route
| Sector | FDI cap | Route | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| LNG / natural gas | 100% (government may acquire equity participation) | Conditional (INP / National Petroleum Institute licensing + concession contract) | Mozambique holds one of the world's largest undeveloped gas reserves (Rovuma Basin, Area 1 and Area 4). TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG ($20bn+, force majeure since Apr 2021 due to Cabo Delgado insurgency). Eni Coral South FLNG operational since 2022 (3.4 MTPA). ExxonMobil Rovuma LNG (pre-FID). CIT and royalties under contract-specific Production Sharing Agreements. |
| Graphite mining | 95% (government 5% free-carry) | Conditional (INAMI / National Mining Institute licensing) | Mozambique has some of the world's largest graphite deposits. Syrah Resources Balama mine (largest natural graphite mine globally) produces flake graphite critical for EU battery anodes. Other projects: Triton Minerals (Ancuabe), Battery Minerals. EU Critical Raw Materials Act designates graphite as critical. Government holds up to 5% free-carry interest in mining operations. |
| Coal mining | 95% (government 5% free-carry) | Conditional (INAMI licensing) | Vale Moatize mine (one of world's largest coking coal deposits). Exports via Nacala Corridor (rail + port). ICVL (India) Benga mine. Coal sector has underperformed due to infrastructure constraints and global decarbonisation pressure. |
| Agriculture (cashews, cotton, sugar) | 100% | Automatic (APIEX registration) | Cashew nuts: Mozambique is a top-10 global producer. Cotton: historically important in northern provinces. Sugar: Tongaat Hulett (Xinavane, Mafambisse). EU SADC EPA provides duty-free access for agricultural exports. Large areas of arable land available but tenure clarity can be challenging. |
| Aluminum smelting | 100% | Automatic (APIEX registration) | Mozal aluminum smelter (South32, 60% ownership) near Maputo. One of Africa's largest aluminum smelters. Relies on imported alumina and Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power. SEZ benefits available. |
| Manufacturing / SEZ | 100% | Automatic (APIEX + GAZEDA for SEZ/IFZ) | Industrial Free Zones (IFZ) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ): 0% CIT for first 10 years, then 50% reduction for 5 years. GAZEDA (Gabinete das Zonas Economicas de Desenvolvimento Acelerado) administers. Beluluane Industrial Park near Maputo is the flagship SEZ. |
Corporate tax rates
| Scenario | Basic rate | Effective rate | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard | 32% | 32% | Applies to most sectors. Mozambique taxes worldwide income of resident companies. |
| Mining / petroleum | Contract-specific | 32%+ | Mining and petroleum operations are governed by contract-specific fiscal terms under Production Sharing Agreements or concession contracts. Royalties and additional profit taxes apply. |
| SEZ/IFZ (first 10 years) | 0% | 0% | Industrial Free Zone enterprises: 0% CIT for first 10 years. |
| SEZ/IFZ (years 11-15) | 16% | 16% | 50% reduction on standard rate (32% x 50% = 16%) for years 11-15. |
| SEZ/IFZ (after 15 years) | 32% | 32% | Standard rate applies after the incentive period. |
MAT: No minimum alternative tax.. Foreign company PE rate: 32% on Mozambique-source income..[1]
Value-added tax (IVA)
16%[1]
VAT (IVA) at 16% standard rate. Exempt: basic foodstuffs, agricultural inputs, medical supplies, educational materials. Zero-rated: exports. The VAT system is broadly functional but compliance and refund processing can be slow, particularly outside Maputo.
Withholding tax / TDS (key rates for EU parent)
| Type | Rate | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Dividends to non-resident | 20% | 20% final withholding tax. Reduced under DTAs. Mozambique has 10+ DTAs (including Portugal, South Africa, India, UAE, Mauritius). |
| Interest to non-resident | 20% | 20% on interest payments to non-residents. |
| Royalties to non-resident | 20% | 20% on royalties paid to non-residents. |
| Service fees to non-resident | 20% | 20% on management and technical service fees to non-residents. |
Payment and currency
● measured Managed float. The Mozambican metical (MZN) trades at ~65 MZN/USD. Convertible for current-account transactions. Banco de Mocambique (BM, central bank) manages the float. The metical has been relatively stable in recent years but experienced depreciation episodes (2015-2016 during the hidden debt crisis). Capital-account restrictions exist but profit repatriation for registered foreign investments is permitted.[5,6] Profit repatriation permitted for APIEX-registered investments. Dividends, loan service payments, and capital gains can be repatriated in freely convertible currency. BM approval and supporting documentation required. Foreign-currency accounts permitted for export-oriented enterprises. SEZ/IFZ enterprises have more favourable repatriation terms.
◐ inferred Payment terms in Mozambican B2B trade are typically 30-90 days. USD invoicing is common in international trade and the extractive sector. The banking sector is concentrated (BCI, Millennium BIM, Standard Bank dominate). Mobile money is growing (M-Pesa Mozambique) but less penetrated than in East Africa. Letters of credit and bank guarantees are standard for large transactions.[5]
Production-Linked Incentives
● measured Mozambique uses SEZ/IFZ regimes (0% CIT for 10 years), APIEX investment registration, and sector-specific concession agreements. The extractive sector (LNG, graphite, coal) dominates FDI. The Cabo Delgado insurgency has delayed the largest single investment (TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG, $20bn+).[5,6,7,8]
| Sector | Status |
|---|---|
| LNG / natural gas | Rovuma Basin holds 180+ TCF of proven gas reserves. Eni Coral South FLNG operational (3.4 MTPA, first LNG cargo Oct 2022). TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG ($20bn+, force majeure since Apr 2021). ExxonMobil Rovuma LNG (pre-FID). When fully developed, Mozambique would be a top-5 global LNG exporter. Security in Cabo Delgado is the binding constraint. |
| Graphite | Syrah Resources Balama mine is the world's largest natural graphite mine. Critical for EU battery supply chain (anode material). EU Critical Raw Materials Act designates graphite as critical. Additional projects under development (Triton, Battery Minerals). Northern Mozambique location means Cabo Delgado security is relevant. |
| Coal | Vale Moatize and ICVL Benga mines in Tete province. Exports via Nacala Corridor (rail + Nacala port). Infrastructure capacity is the constraint. Global decarbonisation pressure is a long-term headwind. |
| Agriculture | Cashews, cotton, sugar. Vast arable land. EU duty-free access via SADC EPA and EBA. Land tenure challenges (all land is state-owned, use rights granted via DUAT). ProSavana (Japan-Brazil-Mozambique agricultural development) was controversial and restructured. |
| Aluminum | Mozal smelter (South32) near Maputo. One of Africa's largest. Uses Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power. SEZ benefits. |
| Heavy mineral sands | Kenmare Resources (Moma mine, ilmenite/rutile/zircon). One of the world's largest titanium feedstock producers. Northern Mozambique location. |
The Cabo Delgado insurgency (since 2017) is the dominant risk factor for northern Mozambique investments, including LNG and graphite. The hidden debt scandal (2016, $2bn in undisclosed government-guaranteed loans) severely damaged investor confidence and led to IMF programme suspension. Governance and corruption remain structural concerns.
Labour framework
● measured Mozambique's Labour Law (Lei do Trabalho, Law 23/2007) governs employment. National minimum wage varies by sector (set by government decree, updated annually). Industrial sector: ~MZN 5,500-7,000/month (~EUR 80-100/month). Employer social contributions: INSS (Instituto Nacional de Seguranca Social) 4% of gross salary (employer), 3% (employee). Standard working week: 48 hours (8 hours/day, 6 days). Overtime: 1.5x (normal days), 2x (rest days/holidays). Annual leave: 12 working days (first year), increasing by 1 day per year up to 30 days. Labour law is national. Labour disputes handled by labour courts. Workforce: ~80% in informal sector and subsistence agriculture. Skilled labour is scarce, particularly outside Maputo. LNG and mining projects typically import skilled workers (subject to quota requirements: operations must employ a percentage of Mozambican nationals, escalating over time).[5]
- Minimum wage varies by sector, adjusted annually by government decree (13 sectors with different rates)
- Employer INSS contribution: 4% of gross salary; employee: 3%
- Local content requirements: mining and petroleum concessions require progressive Mozambicanisation of the workforce
- Work permits: quota system requires foreign employers to justify expatriate positions; government targets increasing local employment over time
- Skilled labour shortage: particularly engineers, technicians, and English-speaking professionals outside Maputo
The opportunity
Mozambique's opportunity for EU companies rests on LNG (Coral South operational, Total delayed), graphite for EU battery anodes, SADC EPA duty-free access, and aluminum (Mozal smelter).
LNG: Coral South operational, Total delayed
● measured Eni's Coral South FLNG has been operational since 2022, producing 3.4 MTPA. TotalEnergies' $20bn+ onshore LNG project remains delayed by the Cabo Delgado insurgency. When operational, Mozambique would become a top-tier global LNG exporter.[5]
Graphite for EU battery anodes
● measured The Balama mine (Syrah Resources) is one of the world's largest graphite deposits. Graphite is on the EU Critical Raw Materials Act list. Mozambique is a key potential supplier for the EU battery value chain.[5]
SADC EPA duty-free access
● measured The SADC EPA and Everything But Arms (EBA) provide Mozambique duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for virtually all products. This is a significant advantage over competitors without preferential access.[5]
Aluminum (Mozal)
● measured The Mozal aluminum smelter is one of the largest in Africa and a major export earner. Aluminum is Mozambique's top non-energy export to the EU.[5]
3. Dangers register
6 entries across 5 categories. Each states the mechanism (how it bites an EU company), the evidence (sourced), the mitigation, and what evidence would change the assessment.
Cabo Delgado insurgency disrupting LNG and mining investments
Mechanism: An ISIS-affiliated insurgency (locally known as Al-Shabaab or Ansar al-Sunna) has been active in Cabo Delgado province since October 2017. The insurgents attacked Mocimboa da Praia (seized Aug 2020, recaptured Aug 2021) and the Palma area near the TotalEnergies LNG site (Mar 2021 attack killed dozens). TotalEnergies declared force majeure on its $20bn+ Mozambique LNG project in April 2021. SADC (Southern African Development Community) deployed a military mission (SAMIM) from July 2021; Rwanda deployed ~2,000 troops. The insurgency has displaced 1M+ people.
Evidence: TotalEnergies force majeure: Apr 2021, not lifted as of mid-2026. Rwandan troops secured Mocimboa da Praia and the Afungi LNG site perimeter. SADC mission ongoing. Attacks continue in rural Cabo Delgado. ~1M internally displaced. Eni Coral South FLNG (offshore, ~40km from coast) operates unaffected. Graphite mines (Syrah Balama, ~300km from conflict zone) have operated with interruptions.[9,12]
Current status: Active but contained. Rwandan and SADC forces have secured key coastal towns and the LNG site perimeter. Rural insurgency continues. TotalEnergies has not lifted force majeure. The security situation is improved but not resolved. Northern Mozambique investments carry material security risk.
Mitigation: Distinguish between onshore northern operations (high risk) and offshore/southern operations (lower risk). Eni Coral South FLNG demonstrates that offshore operations can proceed. For onshore investments in Cabo Delgado: require security assessments, monitor SADC/Rwandan deployment status, and build force majeure clauses into contracts. Southern Mozambique (Maputo, Inhambane) is largely unaffected.
What would change the assessment: TotalEnergies lifting force majeure and restarting construction (the strongest signal). SADC/Rwandan mission achieving durable rural security. Root-cause interventions addressing youth unemployment and marginalisation in Cabo Delgado. Insurgent leadership disruption.
Corruption and governance weakness (CPI ~26)
Mechanism: Mozambique scores ~26/100 on Transparency International's CPI, placing it among the most corrupt countries globally (~142/182). FRELIMO has governed since independence (1975), creating entrenched patronage networks. The judiciary lacks independence. Public procurement is opaque. The hidden debt scandal ($2bn in undisclosed government-guaranteed loans, discovered 2016) demonstrated that senior government officials could create large secret liabilities without parliamentary oversight.
Evidence: CPI 2025: ~26/100. Hidden debt scandal: $2bn in government-guaranteed loans to three state-linked companies (Ematum, ProIndicus, MAM) arranged through Credit Suisse and VTB without parliamentary approval. Former Finance Minister Manuel Chang arrested (2018), extradited to US. Credit Suisse fined $475M (2021). IMF and donors suspended budget support 2016-2022.[8,10]
Current status: Structural. The hidden debt criminal proceedings are ongoing. FRELIMO's dominance was reinforced in the 2024 elections but contested results triggered months of street protests. Anti-corruption rhetoric has not translated into institutional reform. Foreign investors report that informal facilitation payments are expected at multiple levels.
Mitigation: Conduct thorough due diligence on all government counterparties and partners. Structure investments with international arbitration clauses. Use international banking for payments. Monitor the hidden debt criminal proceedings (precedent for accountability). Engage specialised Mozambique counsel with anti-corruption compliance experience.
What would change the assessment: Judiciary independence reforms. Successful hidden debt prosecutions creating deterrence. Public procurement transparency (e-procurement systems). Genuine political competition reducing patronage dependence.
Hidden debt scandal legacy and fiscal credibility
Mechanism: In 2016, it emerged that Mozambique's government had secretly guaranteed $2bn in loans to three state-linked companies (Ematum, ProIndicus, MAM) without parliamentary approval or disclosure to the IMF. The scandal led to IMF programme suspension, donor withdrawal, credit rating downgrades, and a severe confidence crisis. While budget support has partially resumed (2022+), the episode permanently damaged Mozambique's fiscal credibility and demonstrated that undisclosed liabilities can exist.
Evidence: Undisclosed loans: Ematum ($850M, 2013), ProIndicus ($622M, 2013), MAM ($535M, 2014). Total: ~$2bn, equivalent to ~12% of GDP at the time. IMF suspended disbursements. Donors (UK, EU, others) suspended budget support. Sovereign bonds defaulted. Credit ratings: deep junk. Criminal proceedings: US DoJ, UK SFO, Mozambique courts.[10]
Current status: Legacy. The immediate fiscal crisis has passed, but the reputational damage persists. IMF engagement has resumed but with enhanced scrutiny. Sovereign borrowing costs remain elevated. The scandal remains relevant because it demonstrated systemic governance failure at the highest level.
Mitigation: Do not rely on government guarantees or fiscal commitments without independent verification. Structure investments to be commercially viable without government fiscal support. Monitor IMF engagement as a proxy for fiscal transparency. Engage international legal counsel for any government-related contracts.
What would change the assessment: Full resolution of hidden debt legal proceedings. Return to investment-grade sovereign rating (distant). Demonstrated track record of fiscal transparency over multiple budget cycles.
Infrastructure deficit constraining export logistics
Mechanism: Mozambique's transport infrastructure is concentrated in three corridors: Maputo (south), Beira (central), and Nacala (north). The Nacala Corridor (Vale-built rail + port) is the only reliable bulk-export route for coal from Tete province and the primary route for northern Mozambique. Road infrastructure outside corridor zones is poor, particularly in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces. Power transmission from Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam to the south requires transit through Zimbabwe and South Africa (the direct Cesul transmission line has been long delayed).
Evidence: Nacala Corridor: 912km rail line (Moatize to Nacala port). Capacity ~18 MTPA (designed), actual throughput lower. Beira Corridor: older infrastructure, capacity constraints. Road network: only ~30% paved. Cahora Bassa (2,075 MW) exports most power to South Africa via Eskom; Cesul north-south transmission line still incomplete.[11]
Current status: Structural. Infrastructure investment follows extractive-sector demand (Vale built the Nacala Corridor for coal export). General infrastructure investment is constrained by fiscal limitations. The power transmission gap means that northern Mozambique has hydro capacity but southern Mozambique imports electricity.
Mitigation: Plan logistics around existing corridors (Maputo, Beira, Nacala). Budget for infrastructure self-provision (access roads, power generation, water supply) for operations outside corridor zones. Evaluate logistics risk as part of site selection. For power: consider captive generation or solar for off-grid operations.
What would change the assessment: Cesul transmission line completion (connecting Cahora Bassa to southern grid). Nacala Corridor capacity expansion. LNG development creating new northern infrastructure (ports, roads, power). AfDB/World Bank transport corridor investments.
LNG project delays creating fiscal uncertainty
Mechanism: Mozambique's fiscal and economic strategy depends heavily on LNG revenue from the Rovuma Basin. TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG ($20bn+) declared force majeure in April 2021 and has not restarted. ExxonMobil Rovuma LNG has not taken FID. Only Eni's Coral South FLNG (3.4 MTPA, offshore) is operational. The delay means that expected government revenues (royalties, profit taxes, government participation) are not materialising on the originally planned timeline. This creates a gap between fiscal expectations and reality.
Evidence: Originally planned: TotalEnergies LNG first cargo 2024-2025. Actual: force majeure since Apr 2021, no restart date announced. ExxonMobil Rovuma LNG: FID originally expected 2020-2021, not taken. Eni Coral South: operational Oct 2022 (3.4 MTPA). The revenue gap between one FLNG project and the planned three-project scenario is enormous.[12]
Current status: Active. TotalEnergies conducts periodic security reviews but has not committed to a restart date. The company has maintained the concession and contractor relationships. If security conditions improve durably, restart is plausible but would take 3-5 years to first LNG. Meanwhile, Mozambique's fiscal planning is based on a fraction of expected LNG revenues.
Mitigation: Do not base investment cases on Mozambique LNG revenue assumptions until TotalEnergies lifts force majeure. The Eni Coral South operation demonstrates that offshore LNG is viable. Monitor TotalEnergies restart announcements closely. For non-LNG investments: the LNG delay means the government is more eager for alternative FDI but also more fiscally constrained.
What would change the assessment: TotalEnergies restarting construction. ExxonMobil taking FID. Durable security improvement in Cabo Delgado. Global LNG price environment supporting Rovuma economics.
Governance weakness and political contestation
Mechanism: FRELIMO has governed Mozambique since independence (1975), initially as a one-party state, then winning every election since the introduction of multiparty democracy (1994). The 2024 general election results were contested, triggering months of protests across the country. Opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane claimed fraud. The protests disrupted economic activity and exposed deep frustration with FRELIMO governance, particularly among youth. Land rights are administered through the state DUAT (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra) system, where all land is state-owned and use rights can be complex to secure.
Evidence: 2024 election: FRELIMO candidate Daniel Chapo declared winner. Opposition protests lasted Oct 2024-Feb 2025 in Maputo and other cities. Security forces responded with force; dozens killed. DUAT system: all land is state-owned; private use rights granted for up to 50 years (renewable). Informal occupation and overlapping claims are common. Judiciary widely assessed as lacking independence from FRELIMO.[13]
Current status: Active. The 2024 election crisis has subsided but underlying political grievances persist. Youth unemployment is high. FRELIMO dominance continues but its legitimacy is increasingly contested. Land tenure disputes can affect investment projects, particularly in rural areas.
Mitigation: Conduct thorough political risk assessment. Secure DUAT land rights through proper legal process with community consultation (required by law). Build relationships across political spectrum, not only with FRELIMO. Structure investments with international arbitration and political risk insurance. Monitor political developments, particularly around future election cycles.
What would change the assessment: Genuine political reform and electoral transparency. Independent electoral commission. Youth employment programmes reducing protest pressure. Land registry digitisation improving DUAT transparency.
13 primary sources spanning EU/Mozambican government publications, WTO tariff data, Eurostat trade data, and specialist legal/tax summaries.
- [1] PwC / ICLG, Mozambique Corporate Tax Laws (2026): 32% standard CIT; mining/petroleum under contract-specific fiscal terms; SEZ/IFZ 0% CIT first 10 years, then 50% reduction for 5 years
- [2] EU-SADC EPA: Mozambique is a SADC EPA state; duty-free, quota-free EU market access; also eligible for EBA (Everything But Arms) as LDC
- [3] WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2025: Mozambique
- [4] Eurostat COMEXT (ds-059331): EU27 and Finland trade with Mozambique by SITC section, monthly
- [5] US Department of State / Chambers, 2025-2026 Investment Climate: Mozambique
- [6] APIEX (Agencia para a Promocao de Investimento e Exportacoes): investment promotion and administration; SEZ/IFZ regime
- [7] TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG ($20bn+, force majeure since Apr 2021); Eni Coral South FLNG (operational since 2022, 3.4 MTPA); ExxonMobil Rovuma LNG (pre-FID)
- [8] Transparency International, CPI 2025: Mozambique score ~26/100, rank ~142/182
- [9] Cabo Delgado insurgency: ISIS-affiliated Al-Shabaab (Ansar al-Sunna) active since Oct 2017; displaced 1M+ people; TotalEnergies declared force majeure on $20bn LNG project (Apr 2021); SADC and Rwandan military intervention since Jul 2021
- [10] Hidden debt scandal (2016): $2bn in undisclosed government-guaranteed loans (Ematum, ProIndicus, MAM); criminal proceedings in US and Mozambique; former Finance Minister Chang arrested; IMF and donors suspended budget support 2016-2022
- [11] Infrastructure deficit: Nacala Corridor (Vale-built rail + port) is the only reliable bulk-export route for northern/central Mozambique; road network outside Maputo corridor is poor; power transmission gaps despite Cahora Bassa hydro capacity
- [12] TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG: force majeure declared Apr 2021; project suspended indefinitely pending security improvement in Cabo Delgado; $20bn+ investment on hold; restart conditions unclear
- [13] Governance weakness: contested 2024 election results triggered months of protests; FRELIMO one-party dominance since independence (1975); judiciary lacks independence; land rights administered through state DUAT system with limited transparency
As of July 2026. Statutory facts verified against primary sources; practice claims cite the basis.