Domain

Critical Materials & Battery Supply Chains

Two EU regulations now govern the same upstream geography: the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Battery Regulation. Together they name the materials that matter, the suppliers that dominate them, and the obligations that flow back to procurement. This domain links the regulation to the country exposure that turns it into sourcing risk.

Visualisation

Top-country share vs. the CRMA 65% cap

Reference year 2023-2024

CRMA Article 5 caps single-country dependency for any strategic raw material at 65% of EU consumption at any relevant stage. Bars in amber are over the cap today. Mining-stage entries are labelled; the rest are processing or refining.

Over the capAt or under the cap65% CRMA threshold

Approximate top-country supply shares compiled from IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024, USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, and EU JRC Critical Raw Materials studies. Exact shares move year to year; order of magnitude is stable.

Analytical note

Why trade data alone is not enough

The country exposure list above does not come out of import statistics cleanly. China processes ≈90% of the world's rare earths and ≈60–65% of lithium chemicals despite mining little of either; ≈70–85% of Indonesia's nickel processing capacity is Chinese-financed but ships under an Indonesian flag; ≈15–30% of DRC cobalt is artisanal and mixed into formal supply at the trading-house level. Six structural gaps between import data and actual supply risk — with figures and primary sources from IEA, USGS, OECD, JRC and field investigators.