Data • Energy • Refineries
Global Refinery Status
More than 640 oil refineries mapped worldwide, with a curated status overlay for war damage and major outages: red is offline, amber a run cut or damaged restart, bright emerald a verified restart, dark olive the base-rate assumption that an unmentioned refinery runs, grey a status too old to trust. The brighter the dot, the better the evidence behind it. The ring around a dot is a second, separate source: whether a satellite thermal reading agrees with the status we carry. Everything below the map explains both.
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
Loading refinery data...
Assumed operating capacity, mapped universe
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The tally moves with the curated news: confirmed offline capacity subtracts in full, run cuts subtract at sourced throughput where known and at a 50% assumption otherwise, and the band spans stale outages (lower bound: still down; upper bound: quietly recovered). System-wide aggregate entries (Iran, Singapore) do not join individual map dots and sit outside this tally, so the upper bound overstates where only aggregates are tracked.[8]
The backbone: world capacity vs what actually ran, 2014-2024
mb/d, y-axis from 50. Amber: actual refinery throughput. Grey: atmospheric distillation capacity.[12]
The world's refineries have never run anywhere near nameplate: in 2024 they processed 83.0 mb/d against 104.5 mb/d of capacity, 79% utilization, the equivalent of running 290 full-capacity days out of 365. That gap is the world's refining cushion.
Reconciliation: what this page tracks and what it does not
Runs are not consumption. Refinery throughput equals domestic consumption plus net product exports plus stock builds, minus NGLs and biofuels that never pass a refinery. When this page says capacity is "offline" it means the crude distillation units are not running, not that the country's fuel demand is unmet (imports, stock draws, and biofuel substitution can fill the gap).
Stocks are not tracked here. Strategic petroleum reserves, commercial inventories, and short-term stock draws buffer every supply disruption in the short term. This page does not model stocks; a refinery going offline does not immediately translate into a supply shortfall at the pump.
Coverage: ~40% of world capacity. The mapped universe is biased toward large, well-documented facilities that typically run above world-average utilization. Outage tallies apply only to the mapped set. The remaining ~60% is not silently extrapolated.
Regional utilization (EI 2024 baseline)
Utilization varies from 56% (Africa) to 86% (North America). Applying the world average (79%) uniformly overstates the cushion in high-utilization regions and understates it in low-utilization ones.
| Region | Capacity | Throughput | Utilization | Cushion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America | 21.9 | 18.9 | 86% | 3.1 |
| S. & Cent. America | 6.3 | 4.0 | 63% | 2.3 |
| Europe | 15.0 | 11.8 | 78% | 3.2 |
| CIS | 8.4 | 6.6 | 79% | 1.8 |
| Middle East | 11.7 | 9.3 | 79% | 2.4 |
| Africa | 3.5 | 1.9 | 56% | 1.5 |
| Asia Pacific | 37.7 | 30.5 | 81% | 7.2 |
| World | 104.5 | 83.0 | 79% | 21.6 |
mb/d. Cushion = capacity minus throughput (spare capacity at 2024 run rates). Source: EI Statistical Review 2025.
Frequency of attacks: Russia
Dated strikes on Russian oil and gas processing facilities in this page's log, by month. Solid bars are strikes acknowledged by Russian officials or independent wire reporting; faded segments rest on Ukrainian military statements or OSINT only. The Middle East theatre is counted separately and is not in these bars.
The log holds 9 dated strikes in July and 18 in the first 26 days of August. Bloomberg's independent count for July was 18[13], so the earlier bars run low; even against that fuller July figure, August's pace is higher, 0.69 logged strikes a day against 0.58, and the August bar is itself a floor. Per-strike sources sit in the log file alongside this page's data.
What the next strikes can reach
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
The longest strike this page logs is Omsk, hit on 6 July at about 2,500 km from the Ukrainian border. Fire Point's designer attributes it to an extended-range FP-1 whose wing doubles as a fuel tank, and claims a ceiling of 3,400 km; the basic airframe is quoted at 1,600 km and about $50,000 a unit[14]. Those ceilings are the manufacturer's claims. The 2,500 km is a strike with a date and a damaged crude unit.
Measured against this page's own asset file, that demonstrated reach already covers most of what there is to hit. Of 20 Russian refineries with coordinates here, 18 sit inside 2,500 km, holding 3,077 kbd, 87% of the tracked capacity. Within the claimed 3,400 km the figure is every one of them. The distances are great-circle from Ukraine's border, an assumption of this page rather than a launch-site claim, and the method reproduces reported figures to within a few percent.
So range has stopped being the binding constraint, and three other things now decide the tempo. Volume: Fire Point claims 200 strike drones a day across its models[14], while Zelensky puts national output at 200 to 300 a day and says money, not capacity, caps it[17]. Accuracy: Carnegie's estimate of about a 10% target success rate means the arithmetic that matters is launches multiplied by hit rate, not launches[16]. And repair: Orsk's governor put his plant's restart at up to six months because the damaged equipment is imported and sanctioned[19], which is why re-strikes on plants still under repair, as at Ufa on 19 August, cost Russia more than the strike count suggests.
The claimed step-change is the FP-5 Flamingo, a cruise missile advertised at 3,000 km with a 1,150 kg warhead. Its record so far argues for patience: an independent count found ten confirmed strikes between August 2025 and June 2026, with the largest observed volley six missiles against a claimed three a day, and the targets military-industrial rather than refineries[15]. If the production claims become real volleys, warhead size changes what one strike does to a distillation column. That has not happened yet.
Russia's side of the ledger is thinner than the strike count implies. Pantsir systems have been pulled from the front to cover the Moscow refinery[18], air defence that cannot be in two places, and sanctioned spare parts stretch every repair[16]. The projection this page will make, and log against outcomes: absent a ceasefire or a financing collapse in Ukrainian drone production, the constraint through the end of 2026 is hit rate and repair capacity, not how far the drones fly.
War-affected facilities
Two wars fill this table. In the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis over 80 energy facilities were attacked across the Gulf and Iran, taking an estimated 5,900 kb/d of refining and processing capacity offline or to reduced runs[1,2] with Rystad Energy putting total damage at $58 billion.[3] In Russia, the Ukrainian long-range drone campaign has halted most of the largest refineries; the IEA estimates more than 20% of Russian refining capacity offline by mid-2026, while Ukrainian General Staff claims run to 42.7%, a belligerent figure this page does not treat as verified.[11]
Hand-curated from primary reports. Each entry records a verified status change at a named facility during the 2026 Hormuz war or Russia's war in Ukraine. As of 2026-08-26, 47 facilities are tracked. Facilities with no news are assumed operating (base rate), not verified. A reported outage stays in force until a restart is verified, but any status not re-verified within 90 days decays to grey on the map, and the totals above count only fresh events: a further 1,545 kb/d of reported offline, run-cut or damaged capacity is stale and excluded.[1,2,3,4,10]
| Facility | Country | Capacity (kb/d) | Status | Since | Verified | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ras Tanura Refinery | SAU | 550 | operating | 2026-03-13 | 2026-06-27 | Restarted around 13 March after minor damage from the 2 March drone interception. The crude loading terminal stayed shut about four months under the Hormuz blockade; loadings resumed 26 June. Note the evidence boundary: the June and July reporting covers the export terminal, a separate asset, and there has been no reporting on the refinery itself since March, so the operating status here rests on absence of news rather than verification. |
| Samref Refinery (Yanbu) | SAU | 400 | operating | 2026-03-19 | 2026-03-20(stale) | A drone fell on the refinery (50% ExxonMobil) on 19 March; Aramco assessed the damage as minimal and Yanbu port loadings resumed within days. Yanbu served as the main Red Sea export route through the blockade. No facility-specific update after 20 March, so this status decays to assumed operating. Capacity corrected to the roughly 400,000 b/d in Reuters and company-sourced reporting; the 440,000 b/d carried here until 26 August 2026 was unsourced. An IIR note of 10 August 2026 says a refinery at Yanbu was targeted in recent attacks without naming Samref or YASREF or giving a date; unresolved, and not treated here as a status change. |
| Satorp Refinery (Jubail) | SAU | 460 | run cut | 2026-04-14 | 2026-06-18 | Three April drone strikes damaged three units and forced a full shutdown; undamaged units restarted 14 April at 230 kb/d. By mid-June TotalEnergies' CEO put runs at about 70% of the 460 kb/d capacity, with full capacity not expected before early 2027. |
| Ruwais Refinery | ARE | 922 | damaged restarted | 2026-03-10 | 2026-07-17 | ADNOC's Ruwais complex, struck 10 March. No formal ADNOC restart statement exists; the recovery is inferred from crude deliveries, which MEES put at over 200,000 b/d in early July, the highest since August 2025. Nameplate is the wire-standard 922,000 b/d for Ruwais East; MEES describes the whole complex as 837,000 b/d. The 817,000 b/d this page carried until 26 August 2026 appears in no source and has been dropped. |
| Mina Al-Ahmadi Refinery | KWT | 346 | run cut | 2026-06-19 | 2026-07-13 | KNPC's plant, struck three times in nineteen days: 19 to 20 March, 26 March and 3 April. Kuwait lifted its force majeure on 19 June and said full capacity would return within two to three weeks, but IIR still had the refinery on reduced rates on 13 July, so this page carries run cut rather than a restart. Capacity is KNPC's own 346,000 b/d; the 460,000 b/d carried here until 26 August 2026 was unsourced. No Kuwaiti facility-level reporting since 13 July. |
| Ras Laffan LNG | QAT | n/a | run cut | 2026-07-29 | 2026-08-11 | Trains 4 and 6 remain written off, about 12.8 Mt/y, with repairs estimated at three to five years. Loadings have recovered unevenly: Bloomberg put the ten-day moving average at about 80,000 tonnes a day on 11 August, and Energy Aspects forecasts 38.7 Mt for 2026, roughly half of pre-conflict export capacity. The force majeure was last confirmed extended to mid-August and no lift has been reported, so its current standing is unverified. |
| Abadan Refinery | IRN | 260 | offline | 2026-03-02 | 2026-03-20(stale) | Struck 2 March 2026, with large fires visible across the Shatt al-Arab from Basra, and a separate tank fire on 20 March attributed to lightning. The record is contested and unresolved: NIORDC said no tanks or facilities were damaged and that refining operations and output remained normal, while aggregator accounts put the plant 70% offline. No facility-level evidence either way since March, so this status is carried under the page's rule that a reported outage stands until a restart is verified, and it has decayed to unverified on the map. |
| South Pars Gas Field / NGL facilities | IRN | n/a | damaged restarted | 2026-05-31 | 2026-08-22 | Struck 18 March 2026, with four of the field's thirteen processing refineries hit and about a third of production capacity lost; Iranian gas flows to Iraq stopped completely at the time. Iran said on 22 August that Phase 14 repairs are 70% complete with full restoration expected by year end, an operator statement and the most recent Iranian facility-level datapoint found. |
| Singapore refineries (Jurong, SRC) | SGP | 840 | run cut | 2026-04-15 | 2026-07-15 | March run cuts (ExxonMobil Jurong to ~50%, SRC to ~60%) driven by Hormuz feedstock scarcity. Recovery is underway: substitute WTI cargoes arrived from June and the first post-reopening Mideast cargoes discharged in early July, but the IEA's July OMR still has Asia running at reduced rates and no source confirms restored run rates. |
| Iranian refineries (system-wide) | IRN | 2,400 | run cut | 2026-03-07 | 2026-08-25 | Iran's ten refineries hold about 2.4 mn b/d of crude and condensate capacity (NIORDC). This page carried them as 2,100 kb/d offline until 26 August 2026, which the evidence does not support: gasoline output in August ran about 121 mn litres a day against a claimed pre-war capacity near 130 mn, roughly 7% below, so most primary and reforming capacity is running. The 121 figure is itself flattered by methanol blending and quality dilution. No source publishes an Iranian crude-throughput figure for August 2026, so no run rate is asserted here. Treat the shortfall's causes separately: MEES puts the gasoline deficit above 100 kb/d in 2025/26, before the war, so the 15 mn litre daily gap is mostly structural, and what changed is that blockade and war damage closed the imports that used to cover it, about $6bn worth in the year to March 2026. No strike on Iranian energy infrastructure was found between 1 and 26 August, but that is a negative from an incomplete search, not a verified absence: Iranian reporting of such a strike would be suppressed and no imagery assessment was published in that window. |
| Ryazan Oil Refinery | RUS | 342 | offline | 2026-07-29 | 2026-07-30 | Rosneft's Ryazan refinery (17.1 Mt/y nameplate, about 5% of Russian refining) restarted in late July after the mid-May halt, then was knocked out again by a 29 July drone strike. Reuters-sourced reporting put the new outage at about two weeks; no restart confirmed by 26 August. |
| Omsk Refinery | RUS | 442 | offline | 2026-07-07 | 2026-07-07 | Russia's largest refinery (Gazprom Neft, 22 Mt/y). A 6 July drone strike at ~2,900 km range set CDU-10 on fire and halted CDU-11; the plant stopped processing and suspended exchange fuel sales on 7 July. No restart reported. |
| Kirishi-2 Oil Refinery | RUS | 355 | offline | 2026-05-05 | 2026-05-05(stale) | KINEF (Kirishinefteorgsintez, Surgutneftegaz), Russia's second-largest refinery at 17.7 Mt/y. A 5 May strike forced shutdown with three of four primary units damaged; attacked again on 9 July. No restart reported. |
| Moscow Refinery | RUS | 280 | damaged restarted | 2026-08-17 | 2026-08-19 | Gazprom Neft's Kapotnya plant (14 Mt/y). Satellite analysis found no resumption as of 27 July; FT-sourced reporting in mid-August, seen only via secondary outlets, puts it restarted at about a third of capacity. Moscow gas stations reimposed fuel limits on 19 August. The restart level is secondary-sourced and unverified against the original. |
| Nizhny Novgorod Refinery (NORSI) | RUS | 342 | run cut | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-26 | Lukoil's Kstovo plant (17 Mt/y), offline after the 2 July strike. Meduza satellite analysis published 11 August showed partial operation resumed with the AVT-6 crude unit still down in late July. Struck again overnight 26 August with a fire on the premises; damage being assessed (Ukrainian claim). |
| Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat | RUS | 200 | offline | 2026-07-14 | 2026-08-13 | Bashkortostan complex (about 10 Mt/y, 2.7% of Russian refining), taken offline by the 14 July strike. A claimed restart within days was Russian-reported and never confirmed. Struck again on 13 August by about sixteen drones with a fire at the site. No restart reporting. |
| Volgograd Refinery | RUS | 296 | offline | 2026-08-03 | 2026-08-05 | Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka (14.8 Mt/y) resumed after the 29 May strike, was struck again on 31 July, and halted all crude processing on 3 August per Reuters-sourced reporting. About 5% of Russian refining. |
| Syzran Refinery | RUS | 178 | offline | 2026-05-21 | 2026-08-08 | Rosneft Samara-hub plant (8.9 Mt/y). Halted processing on 21 May; struck again overnight 7 to 8 August with roughly thirty explosions and a fire. OSINT reports damage to the AVT-5 and AVT-6 units and the catalytic cracker, unverified at unit level. No restart reporting. |
| Saratov Oil Refinery | RUS | 144 | offline | 2026-08-02 | 2026-08-05 | Rosneft plant. Had resumed after its July shutdown; the sole primary unit AVT-6 has been offline since a 2 August strike, with restoration estimated at two to three weeks in Reuters-sourced reporting. No restart confirmed by 26 August. |
| Kuibyshev Refinery | RUS | 94 | offline | 2026-06-10 | 2026-06-11 | Rosneft Samara-city plant (4.7 Mt processed in 2024; nameplate not sourced). A drone strike on the night of 9-10 June halted both primary crude units (CDU-4, CDU-5) with equipment damage and fires. No restart reported. |
| Tuapse Refinery | RUS | 240 | offline | 2026-04-16 | 2026-04-30(stale) | Rosneft's Black Sea export refinery (~12 Mt/y). A 16 April strike set the port and tank farms ablaze for three days; the refinery halted because the damaged port could not ship products, and was struck three more times through early May amid an ongoing oil-spill disaster. No verified restart. |
| Novokuibyshevsk Refinery | RUS | 176 | run cut | 2026-04-18 | 2026-08-22 | Rosneft Samara-hub plant (8.8 Mt/y), on reduced runs since an 18 April strike. Struck again overnight 21 to 22 August with a fire at the facility; extent of damage being assessed (Ukrainian claim). Production impact of the new strike unconfirmed. |
| Yaroslavl Refinery (Slavneft-YANOS) | RUS | 300 | run cut | 2026-06-28 | 2026-08-06 | Slavneft-YANOS (15 Mt/y, top-five plant). On reduced runs since the 28 June strike; struck again 16 July and overnight 6 August, the seventh strike of the year, with three separate fires confirmed. No halt reported; damage being assessed. |
| Afipsky refinery | RUS | 125 | damaged restarted | 2026-07-14 | 2026-08-25 | Krasnodar Krai plant (about 6.25 Mt/y). Restarted after the 14 July tank fire, then struck around 7 to 8 August and again overnight 25 August, the fifth fire at the plant this year, with a storage tank burning and two killed at the adjacent rail station. Processing impact unconfirmed. |
| Amuay Refinery (CRP) | VEN | 645 | run cut | 2026-06-28 | 2026-07-29 | Back in service after the quake-related power outage, processing about 140,000 b/d of a 645,000 b/d nameplate with the FCC active. |
| Cardon Refinery | VEN | 310 | run cut | 2026-04-20 | 2026-04-20(stale) | PDVSA's Cardon plant next to Amuay. Chronic outages: in April the FCC was restarting after a plant-wide power outage, with combined CRP crude runs about 237 kb/d, roughly 25% of joint installed capacity. No newer status found as of 2026-07-20. |
| El Palito oil refinery | VEN | 146 | run cut | 2026-07-13 | 2026-07-13 | Restarted the FCC around 13 July after the late-June earthquakes and power outages, processing about 35,000 b/d with units reactivated cautiously. |
| Chalmette Refinery | USA | 185 | damaged restarted | 2026-05-08 | 2026-08-06 | PBF's 8-K on the 8 May process upset and fire: a pre-treater was damaged and a reformer brought offline, repairs expected complete in the third quarter of 2026, with the refinery operating at previously planned rates. An August explosion report circulating on aggregators traces back to the May event; no primary source corroborates a new incident. |
| Port Arthur Refinery (Valero) | USA | 380 | damaged restarted | 2026-03-23 | 2026-04-30(stale) | Valero's Port Arthur plant (sources cite 380-435 kb/d). A 23 March explosion destroyed the diesel hydrotreater; crude units, coker, hydrocrackers, reformer, FCC and alkylation were back with throughput largely normalised by 1 May, the kerosene hydrotreater is due back in Q3 2026, and the diesel hydrotreater rebuild has no timeline. The map dot covers the Port Arthur cluster; this event is the Valero facility. |
| Salina Cruz Refinery | MEX | 330 | operating | 2026-06-01 | 2026-06-02 | Pemex's largest refinery. A 1 June fire triggered emergency protocols and the same 16-inch fuel-oil pipeline leaked and burned again on 9 June, 21 June and 8 July; Pemex reports operations maintained through the incidents and no source reports a plant-wide shutdown. |
| Heydar Aliyev Baku Oil Refinery | AZE | 130 | operating | 2026-06-18 | 2026-06-22 | SOCAR's Baku refinery (6.5 Mt/y). An 18 June fire from a heat-exchanger release at the catalytic reforming unit was extinguished the same morning; SOCAR reported no interruption to production. |
| Geelong oil refinery | AUS | 120 | damaged restarted | 2026-04-15 | 2026-08-26 | Viva Energy's plant, damaged by the 15 April fire. Restarted progressively, but reported still a long way from full capacity as of 26 August, consistent with Viva's first-half results commentary. |
| Dangote Refinery | NGA | 650 | run cut | 2026-07-10 | 2026-08-07 | A breakdown forced maintenance from 10 July, cutting crude runs to 350,000 to 400,000 b/d from about 650,000. A catalyst leak is expected to force a temporary RFCC shutdown by late August with repairs projected into late October or November. Domestic gasoline supply fell 21% month on month in July; the plant still supplied about a fifth of Europe's jet fuel that month. |
| Pachpadra Refinery (HRRL) | IND | 180 | operating | 2026-06-22 | 2026-06-22 | HPCL Rajasthan Refinery (9 Mt/y). A 20 April CDU fire from a hydrocarbon leak postponed inauguration and damaged six heat exchangers; the CDU restarted in late May and the refinery was declared commercially operational on 22 June, ahead of its 1 July target. |
| Irving Oil Refinery (Saint John) | CAN | 300 | planned maintenance | 2026-09-08 | 2026-07-20 | Operation Osprey, a C$235 million 75-day turnaround: the refinery comes offline from 8 September, mechanical work runs 11 September to 8 November, resumption from about 18 November, with about 2,100 additional workers on site. |
| Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez (Perm) | RUS | n/a | offline | 2026-08-21 | 2026-08-21 | Lukoil's second largest refinery, among Russia's ten largest. A long-range strike overnight 21 August, over 1,500 km from the border, hit the AVT-4 crude unit and the plant suspended operations. Militarnyi satellite analysis claims over 80% of primary refining capacity lost across cumulative strikes (OSINT, unconfirmed). |
| Taneco Refinery (Nizhnekamsk) | RUS | n/a | run cut | 2026-08-10 | 2026-08-10 | Tatneft's Nizhnekamsk complex. A 10 August drone strike on Nizhnekamsk killed 13 people, the deadliest strike inside Russia in two years; Ukraine's General Staff said it struck the refinery (claim). A further strike on the premises is reported for 20 August. Run status unreported. |
| Tyumen Oil Refinery | RUS | n/a | offline | 2026-07-28 | 2026-07-28 | Independent plant on the former Antipinsky site (about 8 Mt/y per regional reporting). A 25 July drone strike at extreme range set fire to a diesel hydrotreater and a gasoline unit; industry sources say all crude processing halted by 28 July. No restart report found. |
| Orsknefteorgsintez (Orsk) | RUS | 115 | offline | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-13 | Orenburg Oblast plant (5.76 Mt/y). A drone strike overnight 10 to 11 August, about 1,900 km from the border, hit the primary refining unit and processing ceased. The governor said the damaged equipment is imported and repairs could take up to six months under sanctions. |
| Ufa refining cluster (Bashneft UNPZ, Novoil, Ufaneftekhim) | RUS | 470 | run cut | 2026-08-01 | 2026-08-19 | Rosneft's Bashneft hub, 23.5 Mt/y across three plants. Four strikes in August: Ufaneftekhim on the 1st, UNPZ on the 2nd, Novoil on the 5th, and UNPZ again on the 19th, when the head of Bashkortostan said the hit unit was still being repaired from earlier strikes. Run rates unreported. |
| Novoshakhtinsk Refinery | RUS | n/a | offline | 2026-08-25 | 2026-08-25 | Rostov Oblast plant (5.6 to 7.5 Mt/y depending on estimate), previously hit in December 2025 and May 2026. Damaged in an overnight 24 to 25 August drone attack; regional authorities said the facility temporarily suspended operations. |
| Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant | RUS | n/a | offline | 2026-08-24 | 2026-08-26 | Gazprom plant processing up to 12 bcm of gas and about 7.3 Mt of condensate a year. A strike early on 24 August, the sixth attack since February 2025, hit two gas separation units that account for about a quarter of designed capacity; sources report the plant ceased operations. |
| Jazan Refinery | SAU | 400 | offline | 2026-07-27 | 2026-08-21 | Aramco's Red Sea plant, shut after the 27 July Houthi strike damaged the IGCC complex and tank farm, with further strikes on 9 and 13 August and a Houthi claim on 18 August that Saudi Arabia did not confirm. Physical evidence of the outage: no diesel has loaded from Jazan since 24 July. Restart timing is contested, with one IIR-sourced report giving 30 August and IIR's own newsroom saying September; neither is confirmed. |
| Mina Abdullah Refinery | KWT | 454 | offline | 2026-03-19 | 2026-07-13 | KNPC's second Kuwaiti refinery, struck by a drone on 19 March 2026 with a fire in an operational unit. IIR reported it still under shutdown on 13 July, and Kayrros satellite analysis in April found critical units knocked offline at both Kuwaiti refineries, with damage concentrated on crude trains and cokers. The largest Gulf outage this page was not carrying before 26 August 2026. No evidence after 13 July, so no restart is assumed. |
| Bapco Sitra Refinery | BHR | 405 | run cut | 2026-03-09 | 2026-07-13 | Bahrain's only refinery. Bapco Energies declared force majeure on 9 March 2026 after the plant was hit. IIR reported on 13 July that the diesel hydrotreater is not expected back until November 2026, two hydrogen units are under damage assessment, and several other units remain offline or on reduced rates. No report that the force majeure has been lifted. |
| Habshan Gas Processing Complex | ARE | n/a | run cut | 2026-04-03 | 2026-08-01 | ADNOC's largest gas complex, five plants and fourteen trains at 6.1 bscf/d. Two fires on 3 April 2026 from falling interception debris killed one worker, and operations were suspended. Gas supply was back to 85% by the second-quarter results, ahead of the 80% year-end target set in May, but ADNOC's chief executive put full restoration in 2027. Gas plant, so capacity is not expressed in b/d. |
| Zawiya Refinery | LBY | 120 | damaged restarted | 2026-08-12 | 2026-08-13 | Libya's largest operating refinery. Between 8 and 12 August 2026 drones hit the tank farm, an oil blending and filling plant, a desalination unit and a nearby electricity substation; one petrol tank of about 4.5 million litres burned and collapsed. The refinery's process units were not hit and it did not halt. The NOC board warned it would be compelled to declare force majeure if attacks continued, which is a conditional warning and not a declaration. |
Damage estimate: $58bn (Rystad Energy via CNBC). Repair estimate: $34bn, timeline: up to two years.[3]
Where the products come from
Measured: 2024 inter-regional net product trade per EI region (exports minus imports; intra-area flows excluded). Inferred: the war-adjusted column subtracts tracked outage losses from the measured balance.[12]
Three regions were net product exporters in 2024: the Middle East (+4.7 mb/d), North America (+3.3) and CIS (+2.1). Tracked outages remove 6.1 mb/d of capacity from those exporters: the CIS surplus is eliminated, the Middle East surplus roughly halved. Importers (Europe, Asia Pacific, Africa) must find replacement supply or draw stocks. Price consequences are traced on price transmission; crude flow disruptions on maritime.
| Region | Product exports | Product imports | Net (measured) | Outage loss | Net (adjusted) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America | 6.8 | 3.5 | +3.3 | — | +3.3 |
| S. & Cent. America | 0.6 | 2.3 | -1.7 | -0.6 | -2.2 |
| Europe | 1.9 | 4.5 | -2.7 | — | -2.7 |
| CIS | 2.5 | 0.4 | +2.1 | -2.5 | -0.3 |
| Middle East | 6.1 | 1.4 | +4.7 | -2.4 | +2.3 |
| Africa | 0.9 | 2.8 | -1.9 | -0.3 | -2.2 |
| Asia Pacific | 7.4 | 11.3 | -3.9 | -0.4 | -4.3 |
mb/d. Net = exports minus imports (positive = net exporter). Outage loss = nameplate capacity offline or run-cut shortfall from tracked events (hover for cause split). Loss uses nameplate capacity, which overstates actual runs loss by roughly the regional utilization gap (10-20%); the adjusted column is therefore a lower bound on the surviving surplus, not a precise forecast. Intra-area product trade (e.g. within Europe) is excluded from this table.
Regional refinery intake (JODI)
Monthly crude oil refinery intake from the JODI Oil World Database. The Asia and Middle East aggregate tracks the region most exposed to the Hormuz closure, while the EU aggregate shows the downstream product-supply picture for European importers.[9]
Asia + Middle East (latest: 2025-12)
154,777 kt
12 countries reporting
EU (latest: 2025-12)
42,330 kt
27 countries reporting
For the full price-transmission analysis showing how the refinery bottleneck moved the signal downstream (crude cushioned by SPR and spare capacity, while diesel cracks hit records), see the price transmission page.
Dependency structure
Decision this page informs
Product supply security and crack spread exposure
Primary dependencies
- Chokepoint transit (Hormuz, Malacca)● measured
- Refinery operational status● measured
- JODI refinery intake● measured
Binding constraint
Substitutes available
Evidence health
Sources and method (19)
- [1] IEA chief Fatih Birol: 80+ facilities attacked
- [2] Insurance Journal: Gulf refinery damage list
- [3] CNBC/Rystad: $58bn damage estimate
- [4] PressTV: Iran rebuilding, 80% target
- [5] Wikidata: refinery locations and capacity
- [6] OpenStreetMap: refinery geometries
- [7] Wikipedia: 2026 Iran war fuel crisis
- [8] EIA: refinery capacity data
- [9] JODI Oil World Database: monthly refinery intake
- [10] Moscow Times/Reuters: Ryazan refinery halted after May 15 drone attack
- [11] 2025-2026 Russian fuel crisis: IEA and Ukrainian capacity-loss estimates
- [12] Energy Institute Statistical Review 2025: world refining capacity and throughput
- [13] Moscow Times/Bloomberg: 18 refinery attacks in July 2026; runs at 3.6 mb/d, lowest since 2002
- [14] Euromaidan Press: Omsk raid, 2,500 km, FP-1 unit cost; Militarnyi: Fire Point's 3,400 km and 200/day claims
- [15] Missile Matters (Fabian Hoffmann): independent count of FP-5 Flamingo strikes against production claims
- [16] Carnegie (Sergey Vakulenko): drone output and success rate, sanctions on refinery spare parts
- [17] Kyiv Independent: Zelensky on drone output of 200-300 a day and the financing gap
- [18] Defense Express: Pantsir systems moved from the front to protect the Moscow refinery
- [19] Meduza: Orsk governor on imported equipment and a six-month repair estimate
Refinery locations aggregated from Wikidata, OpenStreetMap, Wikipedia, and EIA. Status events hand-curated from primary news reports and verified against multiple sources. JODI data published with a 2-3 month lag. This page does not claim to show every refinery globally, only those with coordinates in the public record.