Maritime Intelligence
Energy and commodity trade routes between the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Analytical flow lines showing structure and relative volume.
Active disruption: Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Since November 2023, Houthi attacks have effectively closed the Red Sea corridor to most commercial traffic. The Suez Canal, which carried roughly 12-15% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic, has seen transits collapse. Major carriers (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd) have rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope for all services that previously used Suez.
Cape reroute fuel premium (VLCC reference)
VLSFO at $540/t (shipandbunker.com, 21 May 2026). Reference vessel: VLCC 300k DWT, fully loaded, 13.5 kts service speed, ~80 t/day VLSFO. Singapore to Rotterdam: Suez 8,400 nm vs Cape 11,700 nm.
Voyage cost calculator
Estimate total voyage costs including fuel, crew, and war risk insurance. Uses typical daily consumption at service speed, industry crew cost benchmarks, and current VLSFO spot price.
At 13.5 kts service speed. Hull values and crew costs are industry mid-range estimates.
Approximate. Actual consumption varies with weather, hull condition, cargo, speed orders, and engine efficiency. Crew costs are industry mid-range averages (officers + ratings, all nationalities). War risk premium is per transit, charged on hull value. Fuel price: VLSFO Singapore spot (shipandbunker.com). Does not include port charges, canal tolls, P&I club calls, or cargo insurance.
Westbound: Gulf and Asia to Europe
Crude oil
Gulf producers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait) are the primary crude suppliers to European refiners. Pre-disruption, roughly 4.5-5 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products transited the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline, a significant share bound for Europe. Since rerouting began, virtually all of this crude now travels via the Cape of Good Hope. Key discharge ports include Rotterdam, Augusta (Sicily), and Trieste. Russian crude, formerly a dominant European supply, has been largely replaced by Middle Eastern and West African grades since 2022 sanctions.
LNG
Qatar ships LNG west to European terminals via Suez (now Cape). US Gulf Coast exports cross the Atlantic directly to NW European regasification terminals. European LNG imports surged to over 100 Mtpa since the post-2022 pivot away from Russian pipeline gas, making the EU the world's largest LNG importer. The Red Sea closure adds 10-14 days to each Qatar-Europe LNG voyage, reducing effective cargoes per vessel per year.
Refined products
Middle East mega-refineries (Jamnagar in India, Ruwais in UAE, Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia) export diesel, jet fuel, and naphtha westward to European markets. This flow has grown as European refining capacity has been rationalised and Russian product imports banned.
Eastbound: Gulf to Asia-Pacific
Crude oil
The Gulf-to-Asia crude corridor is the world's largest by volume. Roughly 17-20 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensate transit the Strait of Hormuz, of which around 14 mb/d heads east to China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The Strait of Hormuz is the single critical chokepoint. Unlike the Red Sea disruption, a Hormuz closure would have no practical alternative route for most Gulf producers and would trigger an immediate global supply crisis.
LNG
Qatar ships LNG directly east to Japan, South Korea, and China. Australia supplies NE Asian markets from its NW Shelf and Queensland facilities. US Gulf Coast LNG reaches Asia via the Panama Canal. Asian LNG demand continues to grow, particularly in China and emerging SE Asian markets (Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand).
Petrochemicals
Middle East petrochemical exports (ethylene, polyethylene, methanol) to Asian markets are a growing corridor. Saudi and UAE producers benefit from cheap feedstock gas, while Asian economies are the dominant consumers. This trade moves through Hormuz and across the Indian Ocean to Malacca.
Used Cooking Oil: the EU's biofuel feedstock bottleneck
The EU's Renewable Energy Directive (RED II/III) counts UCO-based biodiesel as double toward transport fuel mandates, making it the most commercially attractive waste-based feedstock. Europe imports roughly 3-4 million tonnes of UCO annually, primarily from China, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The trade moves by tanker through Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, through Suez (now Cape), and into northwest European ports like Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
Fraud risk is the central concern. The double-counting incentive creates a price premium that makes it profitable to blend virgin palm oil into UCO shipments. The EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has investigated large-scale misdeclaration, and several member states have tightened certification requirements. China has also faced pressure to improve UCO export traceability and quality controls.
LNG: supply diversification reshaping corridors
The global LNG market has shifted structurally since 2022. European buyers, cut off from Russian pipeline gas, now compete directly with Asian buyers for seaborne LNG. Qatar is expanding capacity from 77 to 126 Mtpa (North Field East and South), with first volumes expected 2026-2027. US Gulf Coast export capacity has grown rapidly, with projects like Plaquemines and Golden Pass ramping up through 2025-2027, bringing total US export capacity to over 125 Mtpa.
This creates two distinct corridor patterns: Qatar ships both west (via Suez/Cape) and east (direct to Asia). US exports go east through Panama to Asian buyers or across the Atlantic to Europe. The Red Sea closure forces Qatar-to-Europe LNG around the Cape, increasing voyage costs and reducing the number of effective cargoes per vessel per year, which tightens the market.
The commercial cost of maritime insecurity
The cost of the Red Sea disruption is not a single number. It compounds across fuel, insurance, freight rates, vessel availability, and inventory carrying costs. The OECD International Transport Forum estimates the direct shipping cost increase at $15-20 billion per year, with broader economic effects through supply chain delays and price pass-through adding to the total.
Fuel and voyage costs
The Cape reroute adds roughly 3,000-3,500 nautical miles to a typical Asia/Gulf-to-Europe transit. For a large container vessel, that means an additional 150-300 tonnes of bunker fuel per voyage at $500-600/tonne (VLSFO), adding $80,000-$180,000 in fuel alone. For a VLCC tanker, the additional fuel cost can reach $400,000-$500,000 per voyage. Factor in additional charter hire for the extra 10+ days and total additional voyage costs reach $1-2 million. Multiply across thousands of annual transits and the direct shipping cost increase runs into billions.
Insurance: war risk and hull premiums
Before the crisis, war risk insurance for Red Sea transits was nominal, around 0.05% of hull value, and often waived entirely. By December 2023 it had spiked to 0.7%, reaching 1.0% of hull value per voyage by early 2024. The rate has remained volatile since: following renewed attacks in mid-2025, premiums surged from ~0.3% back to 0.7%. After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in October 2025, rates eased to around 0.2%, but underwriters have signalled that a return to pre-crisis levels is unlikely while the threat persists.
In dollar terms: for a container vessel valued at $100-150 million, a 0.5% war risk premium means $500,000-$750,000 per transit, a cost that simply did not exist before November 2023. At the 1.0% peak, that doubles. The Lloyd's Market Association Joint War Committee extended the listed area to cover the full southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The effects extend beyond war risk. Even vessels that avoid the Red Sea entirely face elevated hull and machinery premiums as underwriters reprice general maritime risk. P&I clubs have increased calls to cover higher claims. Chinese- and Hong Kong-owned vessels have received somewhat lower premiums, reflecting their lower targeting risk profile in the region.
Freight rates and vessel capacity
Longer voyages tie up vessels for more days per round trip, reducing effective fleet capacity by an estimated 5-9% for trades that previously used Suez. This tightens supply even on unrelated routes, since the global fleet is interconnected. Container spot rates on Asia-Europe surged 2-3x in early 2024 (Shanghai Containerized Freight Index). Tanker rates on Middle East-Europe routes remain structurally elevated. The tightness is self-reinforcing: fewer effective voyages per vessel per year means charterers compete for scarce slots, pushing rates higher.
Inventory and working capital
The 10-14 day delay per voyage means importers must hold larger buffer stocks or accept supply gaps. For energy commodities priced at tens of thousands of dollars per tonne, the additional inventory carrying cost is material. European refiners importing Gulf crude via Cape instead of Suez have roughly two additional weeks of capital tied up in transit per cargo. For companies running just-in-time supply chains, the rerouting forced a structural shift toward holding more safety stock.
Gulf of Guinea: a separate cost layer
West African piracy adds costs distinct from the Red Sea disruption. While incidents have declined since the Nigerian Suppression of Piracy Act (2019) and increased naval patrols under the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum, armed robbery remains a risk at port approaches and anchorages. The IMB reported a decline in Gulf of Guinea incidents but the region still accounts for a significant share of global maritime crime. Operators budget $30,000-$100,000 per transit for armed security teams on tankers, and kidnap-and-ransom insurance adds another layer. For crude tankers loading in Nigeria and Angola, these costs are built into voyage economics.
Risk zone profiles
Red Sea: Houthi disruption zone
Active since November 2023. Houthi forces in Yemen have deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, and naval mines against commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea. Attacks have continued despite US/UK military strikes on launch sites and multiple ceasefire attempts. All major container lines and most tanker operators have rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope.
Gulf of Aden: piracy and conflict corridor
The southern gateway to and from Suez. Houthi operations extend into the Gulf of Aden, and Somali piracy, though mostly suppressed since 2013, has not been eliminated. The Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint at the western end is the narrowest passage. The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) and multinational naval patrols remain operational but are less effective against missile and drone threats than against piracy.
Strait of Hormuz: geopolitical risk
No active disruption as of writing, but periodic tension between Iran and Western navies makes this the world's highest-stakes chokepoint. Iran has repeatedly threatened closure during diplomatic crises. IRGC naval forces and missile batteries have the capability to mine or blockade the strait. Approximately 21 mb/d of crude oil and around 20% of global LNG transits Hormuz. There is no practical alternative for most Gulf producers. A sustained closure would be the most severe energy supply shock in history and would likely trigger a global recession.
Gulf of Guinea: piracy risk
Incidents have declined since the Nigerian Suppression of Piracy Act (2019) and increased naval cooperation under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, but armed robbery at port approaches and anchorages persists. The threat is armed robbery and kidnap-for-ransom, distinct from the missile/drone threat in the Red Sea. Operators budget $30,000-$100,000 per transit for armed security teams on tankers. Nigeria and Angola are major crude exporters (~3 mb/d combined), making this a cost layer that European and Asian refiners cannot avoid.
About the 2023 reference baseline
The chokepoint data on this page and on the PortWatch monitoring dashboard uses 2023 as a pre-disruption reference. This is deliberate: 2023 was the last full calendar year of normal Suez-route operations. Comparing current volumes to 2023 levels reveals the structural shift in traffic patterns since rerouting began. A chokepoint showing 60% of its 2023 baseline is not underperforming; it has lost that traffic to the Cape route. The baseline is the analytical anchor, not stale data.
Daily transit calls and trade volume at 11 chokepoints. See which points are above or below their 2023 pre-disruption norm.
Weekly arrivals and departures at Singapore, Port Klang, Fujairah, Istanbul, Rotterdam.
Custom corridor analysis, commodity-level detail, and supply chain exposure briefings.
Get in touch →Data sources and methodology
Map data
Shipping lane geometry: Benden, P. (2022). Global Shipping Lanes. Zenodo. doi:10.5281/zenodo.6361763. CC BY 4.0.
Commodity flow lines: analytical constructs computed with searoute-py (natural earth + OSM data). Width reflects relative volume.
Risk zone boundaries: reviewed May 2025, updated manually.
Chokepoint reference data: IMF PortWatch. 2023 annual baseline, 11 global chokepoints.
Port activity: VesselAPI. Weekly refresh, 5 monitored ports.
Insurance and disruption cost analysis
War risk premium data and trends: S&P Global (Dec 2025), Kpler (Nov 2025).
Pre-crisis to peak premium range (0.05% → 1.0%): Policyholder Pulse, FreightAmigo.
Mid-2025 premium volatility (0.3% → 0.7%): Geopolits.
Trade flow and disruption cost data
Suez Canal and Hormuz transit volumes: US EIA chokepoint analysis; UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2024.
Aggregate disruption cost estimate ($15-20B/yr): OECD International Transport Forum.
Additional voyage cost per transit ($1-2M): Kpler shipping analytics.
EU LNG imports (100+ Mtpa): IEA Gas Market Report; GIIGNL Annual Report.
Qatar LNG expansion (77 → 126 Mtpa): QatarEnergy corporate disclosures.
Fleet capacity loss (5-9%): S&P Global container shipping analysis.
Gulf of Guinea piracy trends: ICC International Maritime Bureau annual piracy report.
Voyage cost calculator
Vessel consumption benchmarks: industry averages from Ship Universe, Maritime Page, and classification society data. Approximate mid-range values at service speed.
Crew cost benchmarks: industry mid-range daily rates (officers + ratings) from BIMCO/ICS Manpower Report and Moore Stephens OpCost benchmarking. Includes wages, victualling, and travel.
Hull values: approximate newbuild/resale mid-range estimates from Clarksons Research and VesselsValue. Used as the basis for war risk premium calculation.
War risk premium tiers: based on Lloyd's Market Association Joint War Committee listed area rates as reported by S&P Global, Kpler, and FreightAmigo (see insurance sources above).
Bunker fuel price (VLSFO Singapore spot): Ship & Bunker. Weekly refresh.
Route distances (Singapore-Rotterdam): Sea News; SeaRates distance calculator.