Maritime • Chokepoints and transit risk
Maritime Chokepoints and Transit Risk
The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis is the largest maritime energy disruption since the 1973 embargo, and it is still in progress. This page tracks the live data: daily chokepoint transits from IMF PortWatch[1], EIA spot prices[8], bypass pipeline capacity[5,6], and the event timeline. The Red Sea disruption that began in November 2023 remains the other active natural experiment in chokepoint substitutability.
How to read this page: ● measured sourced data · ◐ inferred analyst reading, basis linked · ○ projected anchored to a real starting point. Bracketed citations link to the sources at the foot of the page.
Live monitoring
Chokepoint transit board
7-day average vessel calls vs 2023 pre-disruption baseline[1]. Sparklines show the last 90 days of daily transits.
Active crisis: Strait of Hormuz
● measuredThe Hormuz crisis began on 28 February 2026 with US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Iran declared the strait "closed" on 4 March[15]. Transit calls collapsed from a 2023 baseline of ~98 vessels per day[1] to single digits by early July. The IEA announced a 400 Mbbl coordinated stock release on 11 March, the largest since the agency was founded in 1974[7]. Brent crude peaked near $138/bbl on 7 April before falling back as ceasefire talks progressed[8]. The MOU ceasefire collapsed on 8 July after Iranian attacks on commercial vessels, and the US reinstated its naval blockade on 14 July[15].
Current (7d avg)
~5/day
Transit calls collapsed
| Pipeline | Capacity | Operator country | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| East-West (Petroline) | 5–7 mb/d | Saudi Arabia | Operational |
| Habshan-Fujairah (ADCOP) | 1.5–1.8 mb/d | UAE | Operational |
| Kirkuk-Ceyhan | ~1.6 mb/d | Iraq | Operational |
| Goreh-Jask | 1 mb/d nominal | Iran | Non-operational |
Five Gulf producers (Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran) have zero pipeline bypass[3].
Crisis timeline (Feb 2026 to present)
Price transmission
Where the price signal went
Crude prices have halved from their crisis peak, falling from $138/bbl to ~$70/bbl as SPR releases and ceasefire hopes cooled the headline. But the price signal moved downstream: the diesel crack spread (ULSD minus Brent) nearly doubled from ~$45/bbl at the crude peak to $79/bbl, and remains elevated at ~$69/bbl[8]. The world no longer has an oil problem; it has a refining-margin problem. Crude supply was cushioned by SPR releases and non-Hormuz producers. Refining capacity was not.
Full price-transmission analysis with daily charts: Where the price signal went →
Case study: Red Sea natural experiment (2023-2026)
● measuredThe Red Sea disruption that began in November 2023 is the most valuable natural experiment in chokepoint substitutability since the 1956 Suez Crisis. It proved that the Cape of Good Hope route can absorb virtually all rerouted traffic, but at a significant cost in time, fuel, insurance, and effective fleet capacity[4,10]. The key finding: unlimited bypass capacity exists (Cape has no draft or congestion constraint), but it is not free. The rerouting absorbed ~$1 trillion in trade disruption over the first seven months[17].
Red Sea timeline
The commercial cost of maritime disruption
Disruption costs compound across fuel, insurance, freight rates, vessel availability, and inventory carrying costs. The OECD International Transport Forum estimates the direct shipping cost increase from Red Sea rerouting alone at $15-20 billion per year[11].
Cape reroute fuel premium (VLCC reference)
VLSFO at $784.5/t (shipandbunker.com[12], 31 Aug 2026). Reference vessel: VLCC 300k DWT, fully loaded, 13.5 kts service speed, ~80 t/day VLSFO. Singapore to Rotterdam: Suez 8,400 nm vs Cape 11,700 nm.
Voyage cost calculator
Estimate total voyage costs including fuel, crew, and war risk insurance. Uses typical daily consumption at service speed, industry crew cost benchmarks, and current VLSFO spot price[12].
At 13.5 kts service speed. Hull values and crew costs are industry mid-range estimates.
Approximate. Actual consumption varies with weather, hull condition, cargo, speed orders, and engine efficiency. Crew costs are industry mid-range averages (officers + ratings, all nationalities). War risk premium is per transit, charged on hull value[9]. Fuel price: VLSFO Singapore spot[12]. Does not include port charges, canal tolls, P&I club calls, or cargo insurance.
Dependency structure
Decision this page informs
Transit exposure of supply base to chokepoint disruption
Primary dependencies
- Hormuz daily transit (PortWatch)● measured
- IEA SPR release volume● measured
- Diesel crack spread (EIA)● measured
Binding constraint
Substitutes available
Evidence health
Westbound: Gulf and Asia to Europe
Crude oil
Gulf producers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait) are the primary crude suppliers to European refiners. Pre-disruption, roughly 4.5-5 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products transited the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline[4], a significant share bound for Europe. Since rerouting began, virtually all of this crude now travels via the Cape of Good Hope. Key discharge ports include Rotterdam, Augusta (Sicily), and Trieste. Russian crude, formerly a dominant European supply, has been largely replaced by Middle Eastern and West African grades since 2022 sanctions.
LNG
Qatar ships LNG west to European terminals via Suez (now Cape). US Gulf Coast exports cross the Atlantic directly to NW European regasification terminals. European LNG imports surged to over 100 Mtpa since the post-2022 pivot away from Russian pipeline gas, making the EU the world's largest LNG importer. The Red Sea closure adds 10-14 days to each Qatar-Europe LNG voyage, reducing effective cargoes per vessel per year[10].
Refined products
Middle East mega-refineries (Jamnagar in India, Ruwais in UAE, Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia) export diesel, jet fuel, and naphtha westward to European markets. This flow has grown as European refining capacity has been rationalised and Russian product imports banned.
Eastbound: Gulf to Asia-Pacific
Crude oil
The Gulf-to-Asia crude corridor is the world's largest by volume. Roughly 17-20 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensate transit the Strait of Hormuz, of which around 14 mb/d heads east to China, India, Japan, and South Korea[3]. The Strait of Hormuz is the single critical chokepoint. Unlike the Red Sea disruption, a Hormuz closure has no practical alternative route for most Gulf producers and would trigger an immediate global supply crisis.
LNG
Qatar ships LNG directly east to Japan, South Korea, and China. Australia supplies NE Asian markets from its NW Shelf and Queensland facilities. US Gulf Coast LNG reaches Asia via the Panama Canal. Asian LNG demand continues to grow, particularly in China and emerging SE Asian markets (Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand).
Petrochemicals
Middle East petrochemical exports (ethylene, polyethylene, methanol) to Asian markets are a growing corridor. Saudi and UAE producers benefit from cheap feedstock gas, while Asian economies are the dominant consumers. This trade moves through Hormuz and across the Indian Ocean to Malacca.
Used Cooking Oil: the EU's biofuel feedstock bottleneck
The EU's Renewable Energy Directive (RED II/III) counts UCO-based biodiesel as double toward transport fuel mandates, making it the most commercially attractive waste-based feedstock. Europe imports roughly 3-4 million tonnes of UCO annually, primarily from China, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The trade moves by tanker through Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, through Suez (now Cape), and into northwest European ports like Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
Fraud risk is the central concern. The double-counting incentive creates a price premium that makes it profitable to blend virgin palm oil into UCO shipments. The EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has investigated large-scale misdeclaration, and several member states have tightened certification requirements. China has also faced pressure to improve UCO export traceability and quality controls.
LNG: supply diversification reshaping corridors
The global LNG market has shifted structurally since 2022. European buyers, cut off from Russian pipeline gas, now compete directly with Asian buyers for seaborne LNG. Qatar is expanding capacity from 77 to 126 Mtpa (North Field East and South), with first volumes expected 2026-2027. US Gulf Coast export capacity has grown rapidly, with projects like Plaquemines and Golden Pass ramping up through 2025-2027, bringing total US export capacity to over 125 Mtpa.
This creates two distinct corridor patterns: Qatar ships both west (via Suez/Cape) and east (direct to Asia). US exports go east through Panama to Asian buyers or across the Atlantic to Europe. The Red Sea closure forces Qatar-to-Europe LNG around the Cape, increasing voyage costs and reducing the number of effective cargoes per vessel per year, which tightens the market.
Cost structure of maritime insecurity
Fuel and voyage costs
The Cape reroute adds roughly 3,000-3,500 nautical miles to a typical Asia/Gulf-to-Europe transit. For a VLCC tanker, the additional fuel cost can reach $400,000-$500,000 per voyage. Factor in additional charter hire for the extra 10+ days and total additional voyage costs reach $1-2 million[19].
Insurance: war risk and hull premiums
Before the crisis, war risk insurance for Red Sea transits was nominal, around 0.05% of hull value. By December 2023 it had spiked to 0.7%, reaching 1.0% of hull value per voyage by early 2024[9]. For a container vessel valued at $100-150 million, a 0.5% war risk premium means $500,000-$750,000 per transit. The Lloyd's Market Association Joint War Committee extended the listed area to cover the full southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Freight rates and vessel capacity
Longer voyages tie up vessels for more days per round trip, reducing effective fleet capacity by an estimated 5-9% for trades that previously used Suez. Container spot rates on Asia-Europe surged 2-3x in early 2024. Tanker rates on Middle East-Europe routes remain structurally elevated.
Inventory and working capital
The 10-14 day delay per voyage means importers must hold larger buffer stocks or accept supply gaps. For energy commodities priced at tens of thousands of dollars per tonne, the additional inventory carrying cost is material[10].
Gulf of Guinea: a separate cost layer
West African piracy adds costs distinct from the Red Sea disruption. While incidents have declined since the Nigerian Suppression of Piracy Act (2019), armed robbery remains a risk at port approaches[18]. Operators budget $30,000-$100,000 per transit for armed security teams on tankers. Nigeria and Angola are major crude exporters (~3 mb/d combined), making this a cost layer that European and Asian refiners cannot avoid.
Risk zone profiles
Red Sea: Houthi disruption zone
Active since November 2023. Houthi forces in Yemen have deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, and naval mines against commercial vessels[16]. All major container lines and most tanker operators have rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope.
Strait of Hormuz: active crisis
Active since February 2026. Iran declared closure, transit has collapsed to single digits per day from a baseline of ~98[1,15]. Approximately 20 mb/d of crude oil and around 20% of global LNG normally transits Hormuz[3]. Bypass pipeline capacity of ~9 mb/d is available but covers less than half of normal flow[5,6].
Gulf of Guinea: piracy risk
Incidents have declined since 2019 but armed robbery at port approaches persists[18]. Nigeria and Angola are major crude exporters (~3 mb/d combined).
About the 2023 reference baseline
The chokepoint data on this page and on the PortWatch monitoring dashboard uses 2023 as a pre-disruption reference[1]. This is deliberate: 2023 was the last full calendar year of normal Suez-route operations. Comparing current volumes to 2023 levels reveals the structural shift in traffic patterns since rerouting began. A chokepoint showing 60% of its 2023 baseline is not underperforming; it has lost that traffic to the Cape route. The baseline is the analytical anchor, not stale data.
Daily transit calls and trade volume at 11 chokepoints. See which points are above or below their 2023 pre-disruption norm.
Daily Brent, WTI, ULSD, gasoline, and crack spreads since 2023. Where the Hormuz price signal went.
Weekly arrivals and departures at Singapore, Port Klang, Fujairah, Istanbul, Rotterdam.
68 countries, 1000 ports monitored. Source: IMF PortWatch.
Custom corridor analysis, commodity-level detail, and supply chain exposure briefings.
Get in touch →Sources and method (19)
- [1] IMF PortWatch: daily chokepoint transit data
- [2] EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints
- [3] EIA Today in Energy: Hormuz oil chokepoint (65504)
- [4] EIA Today in Energy: Red Sea chokepoints (61025)
- [5] CNBC: Strait of Hormuz alternative routes
- [6] Al Jazeera: Saudi, UAE, Iraq bypass pipelines
- [7] IEA: 400 Mbbl coordinated stock release announcement
- [8] EIA Petroleum API v2: daily spot prices
- [9] S&P Global: maritime war risk premium trends (Dec 2025)
- [10] UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2024
- [11] OECD International Transport Forum: shipping cost estimates
- [12] Ship & Bunker: VLSFO Singapore spot
- [13] VesselAPI: port activity data
- [14] Benden, P. (2022). Global Shipping Lanes. Zenodo. CC BY 4.0
- [15] Wikipedia: 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline
- [16] Wikipedia: Red Sea crisis timeline
- [17] Russell Group: Red Sea trade disruption estimate ($1T)
- [18] ICC International Maritime Bureau: piracy annual report
- [19] Kpler: Red Sea risk maritime insurance analysis
Chokepoint transit data is published by IMF PortWatch with approximately 10 days of lag. EIA spot prices are daily, typically lagged 1-2 business days. Bunker price is weekly from Ship & Bunker Singapore. Event dates verified via web search 2026-07-15.